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Sabtu, 16 Maret 2013

Bad Science (and Perhaps Conflict of Interest) At ONC / HHS

This article recently appeared, quoting Jacob Reider, M.D., chief medical officer at ONC on an upcoming Health IT Safety Plan:

Health Data Management

http://www.healthdatamanagement.com/news/HIMSS13-ONC-HIT-safety-plan-45809-1.html 

ONC Sets Early Summer for Release of HIT Safety Plan

The Office of the National Coordinator for Health Information Technology anticipates releasing a final health information technology safety plan by early summer, officials announced on March 5 at HIMSS13 in New Orleans.

ONC released a draft plan in December and accepted public comment until February 4. The draft followed an Institute of Medicine report that ONC commissioned that highlighted the need for better understanding of the HIT impacts on safety, as well as shared responsibilities among all stakeholders to improve safety, Jodi Daniel, director of the ONC office of policy and planning, said during an educational session.

There is little doubt that use of I.T. results in fewer medical errors, particularly medication-related because of electronic prescriptions and clinical decision support, noted Jacob Reider, M.D., chief medical officer at ONC. “It’s obvious that in many areas there will be fewer errors, but at the same time, in other areas there will be more errors.” Consequently, a priority of the plan will be implementing a framework to help the industry better understand what the trouble areas will be as I.T. use increases.

Less than 1 percent of patient safety events are related to HIT, Reider contended, but the industry needs more data to better understand the level of harm from such events and how to improve the technology. HIT-related errors, he reminded the audience, are not always the fault of vendors; providers can introduce risk when customizing their systems.

The upcoming safety plan release is fine and good, but I, for one, wonder if it can be trusted.

The level of bias and lack of knowledge of the domain, evidence of incomplete research, and/or poor scientific judgement inherent in the statements I bolded above are disturbing.  They are also  reminiscent of the problems in the ONC-authored paper discussed at this link.

First:

  • There is little doubt that use of I.T. results in fewer medical errors

On the contrary, there is significant well-researched doubt in that the evidence is quite contradictory.  Let's cite the IOM's 2012 report on health IT risk:

… “For example, the number of patients who receive the correct medication in hospitals increases when these hospitals implement well-planned, robust computerized prescribing mechanisms and use barcoding systems. But even in these instances, the ability to generalize the results across the health care system may be limited. For other products— including electronic health records, which are being employed with more and more frequency— some studies find improvements in patient safety, while other studies find no effect 

IOM (Institute of Medicine) 2012. Health IT and Patient Safety: Building Safer Systems for Better Care (PDF). Washington, DC: The National Academies Press.

Let's quote one of the IOM study panel members, an international authority on safety, Dr. Richard Cook:

... HIT's cornucopia has been promised repeatedly since the 1960's. Nothing like the promises has materialized.  Indeed, the IOM committee that was commissioned to evaluate the best evidence on this subject found no persuasive evidence that HIT improved patient safety. I know because I was there. 

The body of literature here also contains relevant studies contradicting Dr. Reider's quoted, dispositive statement.

Next:

  • It’s obvious that in many areas there will be fewer errors

This statement requires no response, but I'll respond anyway.  

In science, stating something is "obvious" (i.e., what is referred to at the site "36 Humorous Methods of Proof" as "Proof by obviousness") is, on its face, bad science.

Next:

  • Less than 1 percent of patient safety events are related to HIT

The aforementioned IOM report was quite clear on the following:

... Several reasons health IT–related safety data are lacking include the absence of measures and a central repository (or linkages among decentralized repositories) to collect, analyze, and act on information related to safety of this technology. Another impediment to gathering safety data is contractual barriers (e.g., nondisclosure, confidentiality clauses) that can prevent users from sharing information about health IT–related adverse events. These barriers limit users’ abilities to share knowledge of risk-prone user interfaces, for instance through screenshots and descriptions of potentially unsafe processes. In addition, some vendors include language in their sales contracts and escape responsibility for errors or defects in their software (i.e., “hold harmless clauses”). The committee believes these types of contractual restrictions limit transparency, which significantly contributes to the gaps in knowledge of health IT–related patient safety risks. These barriers to generating evidence pose unacceptable risks to safety.

... The magnitude of the risk associated with health IT is not known.

Likewise, FDA has concluded that what they know on HIT-related patient safety events is likely "the tip of the iceberg"  due to systematic impediments to knowing, as has the ECRI Institute who has only now begun to study the issue with any degree of rigor.  (The results are of great concern to anyone who should know, or should have made it their business to know, as at this link.)

Perhaps Dr. Reider needs a lesson on basic epistemology:  "We simply don't know what we don't know."

Finally:

  • HIT-related errors, he reminded the audience, are not always the fault of vendors; providers can introduce risk when customizing their systems.

I find it remarkable that a government official uses a public/industry platform HIMSS to defend an industry, while at the same time stating more study is needed to understand the causative factors of harm from the industry's products.

This raises the question of conflict of interest, and the possibility this official is not impartial or trying to be "fair" but aiming towards protecting an industry he once worked for - and to where he's likely to return at some point.  (See Roy Poses' posts on "revolving doors" for examples of that.)

From his government biography here:

Dr. Jacob Reider
Director, Office of the Chief Medical Officer

Jacob Reider, MD is a family physician with 20 years of experience in health information technology and special interest in clinical innovation, user experience, and clinical decision support. His background includes leadership roles in nearly all facets of the health IT domain – from small start-up companies to academic facilities, primary care medical groups, and large health IT development organizations. Dr. Reider has served as a member of the Board of Trustees of the American Medical Students Association, the Society of Teachers of Family Medicine, and has served in directorial positions on boards of several innovative health IT companies.
  
I note I do not find evidence of formal medical informatics education, which selfsame ONC recommends for leadership roles in health IT (see my Dec. 2009 post "ONC Defines a Taxonomy of Robust Healthcare IT Leadership"), but I do find roles such as:

Chief Medical Informatics Officer
Allscripts
June 2009 – January 2011 (1 year 8 months)

Medical Director
Allscripts
March 2007 – June 2009 (2 years 4 months)

Chief Medical Officer
MedRemote (Now Nuance)
November 1999 – December 2002 (3 years 2 months)

One might reasonably wonder what personal gains might accrue to Dr. Reider from the promotion of health IT - which includes downplaying its current risks - from an influential government perch.  (I for example held many Merck stock options after my late 2003 departure.  They remained underwater until expiration, but even a a $10 or $20 increase in stock price could have bought me, say, a new sports car or even house.)

I also note that the former CEO of Allscripts, Glen Tullman was, in fact, a close confidant of our current President and advisor on health IT during his first campaign:

A tireless advocate of technology in medicine, Tullman has been featured in virtually every major news outlet. An early supporter of fellow Chicagoan Barack Obama, Tullman introduced him to the Electronic Health Record (EHR) and served on his finance and healthcare committees during the 2008 presidential campaign.

Is it any wonder, then, that my expectation is that the forthcoming ONC HIT safety plan will be biased towards industry, reflect poor science and incomplete/selective research, and overall be a whitewash?

I'll be presenting on issues such as this to the Plaintiff's Bar.  They seem to be the last protectors of people's/patient's rights where clinical IT is concerned - a role they seem most familiar with in other sectors.

I emailed Dr. Reider a link to this post with a request that if he has robust evidence to support his assertions that is not publicly available, to please release it.

-- SS

Mar. 16, 2012 Addendum: 

A correspondent asked me the following that I thought deserved mention beyond the comments section:

"How would he know, exactly, when we know, that they never tallied the thousands of e-Rx errors from a national Siemens defect that was disclosed only at the Brown Medical Center Hospitals (Lifespan) but was a systemwide defect; nor from the Cerner convert to e-Rx defect that was evident at the Trinity Health System; and millions of other errors from when the e-Rx system was unavailable. Or, do they simply do not count those?"

My response?  No, they probably consider those "anecdotal." 

-- SS
 

Jumat, 15 Maret 2013

IRS faces class action lawsuit over theft of 60 million medical records

Try this with paper records.  This is spectacular (as in, spectacularly alarming) if true:

IRS faces class action lawsuit over theft of 60 million medical records

The Internal Revenue Services is now facing a class action lawsuit over allegations that it improperly accessed and stole the health records of some 10 million Americans, including medical records of all California state judges.

According to a report by Courthousenews.com, an unnamed HIPAA-covered entity in California is suing the IRS, alleging that some 60 million medical records from 10 million patients were stolen by 15 IRS agents. The personal health information seized on March 11, 2011, included psychological counseling, gynecological counseling, sexual/drug treatment and other medical treatment data.

"This is an action involving the corruption and abuse of power by several Internal Revenue Service agents," the complaint reads. "No search warrant authorized the seizure of these records; no subpoena authorized the seizure of these records; none of the 10,000,000 Americans were under any kind of known criminal or civil investigation and their medical records had no relevance whatsoever to the IRS search. IT personnel at the scene, a HIPPA facility warning on the building and the IT portion of the searched premises, and the company executives each warned the IRS agents of these privileged records," it continued.   According to the case, the IRS agents had a search warrant for financial data pertaining to a former employee of the John Doe company, however, "it did not authorize any seizure of any healthcare or medical record of any persons, least of all third parties completely unrelated to the matter," the complaint read.

The class action lawsuit against the IRS seeks $25,000 in compensatory damages "per violation per individual" in addition to punitive damages for constitutional violations.  Thus, compensatory damages could start at a minimum of $250 billion.

According to the linked Courthousenews.com piece, the class is represented by attorney Robert E. Barnes of Malibu, California.   The Complaint is reported to state that the IRS' data theft was so enormous it affects "roughly one out of every twenty-five adult American citizens."

If a government agency decides to steal medical records, I'd rather the records be on paper than electronic. I think it's inarguable that it is a lot harder for 15 people to haul 60,000,000 paper charts away than a few hard disks.

Mass theft of records must be factored into the risk/benefit ratio of electronic health records.  See other posts on this topic at the label index terms below.

Addendum:  the Complaint is here (PDF).

-- SS

Minimizing Legal Liability or Upholding the Mission? - the Markingson Case Redux

There are new, and troubling developments in the long running case of Dan Markingson, the psychiatric patient and research subject who committed suicide while enrolled in a trial of anti-psychotic drugs at the University of Minnesota nearly 10 years ago.

Summary of the Case

A good quick summary of this case just appeared in the Center for Law and Bioscience blob out of the Stanford Law School. 

Dan Markingson – a vulnerable, psychotic young man – was forced to choose between enrolling in a Pharma-funded drug study or being involuntarily committed (in other words, locked up).  A UMN [University of Minnesota]  doctor enrolled him in the study despite having just determined that Dan 'lack[ed] the capacity to make decisions regarding [his] treatment,' rendering it highly unlikely that Dan could have given valid informed consent to participate.  As Dan's mother, Mary Weiss, observed his mental condition deteriorating, she repeatedly tried to have Dan removed from the trial – at one point asking  'Do we have to wait until he kills himself or someone else before anyone does anything?'  But the UMN co-investigators in the drug study refused to terminate his participation.  Shortly after Ms. Weiss made her desperate plea, Dan Markingson killed himself by cutting his own throat.

Our most recent (2011) post on the case was here.  In it we also noted that there was reason to think:
-  The design of the controlled trial was flawed.
-  Financial conflicts of interests may have influenced the trial investigators' actions, particularly their questionable enrollment of Mr Markingson in the trial and their retention of him in it despite his apparent clinical deterioration.
Despite that, when bioethicists and the University of Minnesota called for a new investigation of the trial and what happened to Mr Markingson, the university rebuffed them.

Worse, as detailed in a 2012 post in the Center for Law and Bioscience blog, not only did university officials rebuff this call, but the university general counsel, who had been operating at the heart of this case, appeared to threaten the leading bioethicist dissident, Dr Carl Elliott:

 After Carl Elliott, the University of Minnesota bioethicist, refused to drop the matter, Rotenberg asked the university’s Academic Freedom and Tenure Committee to take up the question of '[w]hat is the faculty[’s] collective role in addressing factually incorrect attacks on particular university faculty research activities?' – a question that appeared both to accuse Elliott of 'factually incorrect attacks' and to call for some unspecified action to 'address' them.  Other faculty, including the president of the Minnesota chapter of the American Association of University Professors, viewed this as an attempt to intimidate Elliott into silence.  If so, it backfired.  The story ended up in the press, putting the Markingson case back in the public eye and once again making the University of Minnesota look really bad.

New Evidence Unearthed

In 2013, Dr Elliott made public what may be important new evidence in the case.  As summarized by the Minneapolis Star-Tribune,

The professor, Carl Elliott, says he has obtained consent documents for two separate schizophrenic patients that appear to be exact copies — not just in the subjects’ apparent replies, but in the positions of the lettering on the pages.

Elliott said it is improbable that separate patients would provide identical responses to the questionnaire, which includes open-ended questions about the risks and requirements of clinical research. And that, he said, raises questions about whether the university was really examining patients to determine their ability to consent to research.

 One crucial question about the case is how a patient who was actively psychotic - out of touch with reality - could give true informed consent to participation in a drug trial.  These new documents suggest major irregularities in the process used in the trial to assure that patients did give informed consent. 

Furthermore, as reported by the Minnesota Daily, other documents that Dr Elliott found suggested problems with records that related to whether study investigators would have had legal authority to access Mr Markingson's medical records, also suggesting major problems with trial administration. 

These documents, unknown until recently, suggest new concerns with how the study in which Mr Markingson was enrolled, and during which he died, was run.  Yet, the University of Minnesota's official response to them, once again orchestrated by university counsel Mark Rotenberg, attacked the legitimacy of the documents (and indirectly, attacked Prof Elliott again), as reported by the Star-Tribune,

the university’s general counsel, Mark Rotenberg, challenged the authenticity of the documents and disagreed that study recruiters failed to obtain proper and independent consent from mentally ill patients.

'I am challenging these allegations directly,' he said. 'We have no reason to believe the consent forms were prepared inappropriately.'


As Matt Lamkin wrote in the Stanford Law and Bioscience blog,  the University's responses all through this case have been focused  not on the welfare of patients, maintaining the trust of research participants, or the integrity of clinical trials, but on the legal defense of  the University and its leaders

Despite all this (and much more), the University has never acknowledged any errors or taken any disciplinary action related to the Markingson case and has repeatedly rejected calls for an independent investigation.  That’s probably because from the start the University has handled this case as a litigation matter.  Rather than trying to determine whether there were problems with the way its personnel treated Markingson, the University has focused on minimizing its potential liability.  Accordingly, the University appears to run every inquiry related to the case through the office of its General Counsel, Mr. Rotenberg.  When Carl Elliott (my mentor as a grad student at UMN) wrote a damning article about the case in Mother Jones, the University’s response came from Rotenberg.  When UMN bioethicists called on the University’s Board of Regents to launch an independent investigation, the Regents deferred to Rotenberg.  Not surprisingly, he declined.

When you turn to your lawyer, you’re going to get a particular kind of response.  The GC isn’t in a position to take an objective look at the circumstances.  He’s an advocate.  His role is not to make sure the client has conducted itself ethically, but to minimize the client’s risk.  Asking your lawyer to respond to allegations of wrongdoing is like asking your PR flacks to do so.  Their job is to make their clients look good, not to make sure they’ve acted properly.
Note that this still begs the question of who the client is.  Is it the university, or the university's leaders?

Furthermore, as Mr Lamkin pointed out, the general counsel would appear to have a conflict of interest.  It may be he has an interest in defending his own actions, as well as those of his client(s), whether they are the university, its leaders, or both. 

In addition to Mr. Rotenberg’s role as the University’s top defender and advocate, there is another reason he cannot impartially consider requests for an investigation: the General Counsel’s Office is an important player in some of the disturbing events at issue.  As noted above, Rotenberg himself has been accused of attempting to intimidate and silence the bioethicist who has most doggedly sought an investigationThe University’s lawyers are also responsible for the disgraceful silencing of Markingson’s mother, Mary Weiss.  After avoiding liability by arguing the University was immune from suit, these lawyers then threatened to force Weiss – whose son had died in a University doctor’s 'care – to pay the University’s legal costs of some $57,000.  The University used that threat as leverage to get Weiss to forgo an appeal of the trial court’s decision.

So as the University continues to refuse any new consideration of this this seemingly never-ending case, Dr Elliott has posted an online petition calling for an outside investigation.   We will see how Mr Rotenberg reacts to this.

Summary


A very troubling aspect of this case is that it has shown that the university leadership has seemed to care, at best, more about fending off litigation than upholding the university's mission.  The mission of the university is supposed to be discovering and disseminating the truth in a spirit of free inquiry.  Added to the mission of medical schools and university teaching hospitals is taking good care of patients, and putting the patients' interests ahead of all other concerns.  Yet, in this case, university leaders have not seemed to care whether in their haste to push back legal liability they were stepping on their faculty's academic freedom and free speech, the integrity of the medical research done at the university, and most importantly the rights of their patients and research subjects.  Furthermore, it is not clear whether they mainly feared the impact of litigation on the university, or how litigation might actually end up holding them accountable.

As Dr Judy Stone wrote in her Scientific American blog,

  it appears that UMN believes, as do many other institutions, that protecting itself from scandal and its consequences comes first and foremost and that, like the big banks, that it is too big to be punished.

Again, note that UMN cannot itself believe or protect.  People acting ostensibly on its behalf may have been protecting themselves from scandal, and believing that the size and status of their institution gave them, the leaders, impunity.

The case of Mr Dan Markingson is a continuing reminder that to reform health care, health care organizations need to be lead by people who put the health care mission first and are willing to be accountable for that mission.   I hope that eventually there is an honest investigation of this case, and a commitment to reform based on its conclusions.

See additional thoughts from Dr Howard Brody on the Hooked: Ethics, Medicine and Pharma blog, on the 1BoringOldMan blog, on the Periodic Table blog, and last but certainly not least, many comments by Dr Carl Elliott on the Fear and Loathing in Bioethics blog. 

Food Reward Friday

This week's lucky "winner"... fried Coke!


Read more »

Kamis, 14 Maret 2013

Protective Style Lookbook || Double Twisted Bun (Great for Bad Hair Days)

By popular demand, this is a series showcasing various protective hair styles.  Protective styling does not have to be boring. :o)


Model: Ambrosia

Style description: Jumbo flat twists in back bun.

Difficulty level: 2/5


Mixology || Easy Non-Drying Henna Recipe for Conditioning

Do you want to try henna for hair conditioning but you do not know where to begin? Or maybe you are afraid of the dryness sometimes associated with henna?  Well here is a recipe worth trying:

Ingredients:
100g+ neutral henna (amount depends on length thickness of your hair)
1/2 an avocado
1 tsp oil of your choice (olive, grapeseed, castor, etc.)
1 tsp honey

Instructions: 
1. Mix all the above ingredients together in a stainless steel bowl.  (Assuming you are using pure henna, a stainless steel bowl should be fine.)
2. Section damp or dry hair.  Apply using plastic gloves or an applicator brush, section by section.
3. Cover hair with a secure plastic cap.
4. Allow to set for a minimum of 4 hours.  (Some ladies, henna overnight.)
5. Rinse hair thoroughly with warm water to remove henna.
6. Follow up with a conditioner wash.
7. Deep condition with a moisturizing conditioner for 20-30 minutes.
8. Rinse, moisturize, seal, and style as usual.

Source: Original recipe on LongHairCareForum

JAMA: "Improving the Electronic Health Record—Are Clinicians Getting What They Wished For?" - No, But Utopia Arrives Soon

At a new JAMA piece "Improving the Electronic Health Record—Are Clinicians Getting What They Wished For?", former Columbia U. and now NIH medical informaticist James J. Cimino, MD points out issues with the documentation that results from health IT systems.

A preview of the first page of this short Viewpoint piece is available free at this link.  It includes the observation that:

... There is no question that computerization has made patients’ records more available and legible. With respect to completeness, however, there are now complaints that the record is too complete: electronic notes are deemed by many clinicians as being full of extraneous details and obscuring important aspects of a patient’s condition

Dr. Cimino goes on to state that:

Empirical observational studies of clinicians have shown ways to improve EHR functionality ... Similar research on clinical documentation processes is needed to advance this crucial EHR component.

These are excellent observations.

The issue I have with the piece is - and I am finding this true of many articles critical of today's health IT - the ending, which I'm finding to often be PR.  Or, perhaps it would be more accurate to call the endings of late a "salvage operation-style" attempt to save face for the informatics community, who let this domain be overrun by the corporate IT sector and terrible products that violate many of the precepts of design of good health IT learned during five decades of research.

Cimino concludes an otherwise constructive piece with this statement:

... Rather than complain about the challenges [a euphemism if ever I saw one - ed.] they have introduced, clinicians should recognize that current EHRs are illuminating the opportunities for the next generation of systems that will support clinicians as active partners across the spectrum of health care settings and tasks. The resulting improvements in documentation will, in turn, support patients, administrators, and researchers as we move towards a true learning health system.

I note this assertion is at complete odds with the dictum I was taught from my earliest medical mentors, and that no amount of wishful thinking will banish:

"Critical thinking always, or your patient's dead." (Cardiothoracic surgery pioneer Victor P. Satinsly, M.D., Hahnemann Medical College, Philadelphia, early 1970s.)

Translating the statement into plainer English, it seems to me that Cimino is saying this:

"Doctors, shut up, stop complaining about the chaos and patient/professional risk today's bad health IT is causing, take the medicine your betters have prescribed for you, and don't be uncompromising patient advocates as patients are secondary in this quest to reach IT-based Healthcare Utopia - which we will reach come version 2.0."

(This comes, ironically, at a time when physicians are starting to get a voice, e.g., Twitter's #EHRbacklash.)

It appears articles with even a faint tinge of anti-health IT sentiment - in addition to the traditional methods, results, limitations etc. sections - have an "appeasement" section as well.  Perhaps this it what it takes to get past peer review and/or industry ire.

In my view, this salvage mentality sprinkled with euphemisms and Utopian rhetoric spoils an otherwise constructive piece.  This type of language and utopian predictions about HIT have also appeared in other major medical publications by informatics and healthcare leaders (including top governmental office holders), as for example here.

Now, I know Jim Cimino and he is a good scientist.  However, I truly wish the non-scientific, "wait for version 2.0", utopian P.R. would stopAs a member of the Medical Informatics profession myself, it's actually become embarrassing.

-- SS