Model: MsVaughn
Style description: Updo incorporating side flat twists into a vintage roll. Pinned side bang.
Difficulty level: 2/5
The Pennsylvania Patient Safety Authority was established under Act 13 of 2002, the Medical Care Availability and Reduction of Error ("Mcare") Act, as an independent state agency. It operates under an 11-member Board of Directors, six appointed by the Governor and four appointed by the Senate and House leadership. The eleventh member is a physician appointed by the Governor as Board Chair. Current membership includes three physicians, three attorneys, three nurses, a pharmacist and a non-healthcare worker.
The Authority is charged with taking steps to reduce and eliminate medical errors by identifying problems and recommending solutions that promote patient safety in hospitals, ambulatory surgical facilities, birthing centers and certain abortion facilities. Under Act 13 of 2002, these facilities must report what the Act defines as "Serious Events" and "Incidents" to the Authority.
Consistent with Act 13 of 2002, the Authority developed the Pennsylvania Patient Safety Reporting System (PA-PSRS, pronounced "PAY-sirs"), a confidential web-based system that both receives and analyzes reports of what the Act calls Serious Events (actual occurrences) and Incidents (so-called "near-misses").
As adoption of health information technology solutions like electronic health records (EHRs) has increased across the United States, increasing attention is being paid to the safety and risk profile of these technologies. However, several groups have called out a lack of available safety data as a major challenge to assessing EHR safety, and this study was performed to inform the field about the types of EHR-related errors and problems reported to the Pennsylvania Patient Safety Authority and to serve as a basis for further study. Authority analysts queried the Pennsylvania Patient Safety Reporting System for reports related to EHR technologies and performed an exploratory analysis of 3,099 reports using a previously published classification structure specific to health information technology. The majority of EHR-related reports involved errors in human data entry, such as entry of “wrong” data or the failure to enter data, and a few reports indicated technical failures on the part of the EHR system. This may reflect the clinical mindset of frontline caregivers who report events to the Authority.
... Reported events were categorized by their reporter-selected harm score (see Table 1). Of the 3,099 EHR-related events, 2,763 (89%) were reported as “event, no harm” (e.g., an error did occur but there was no adverse outcome for the patient) [a risk best avoided to start with, because luck runs out eventually - ed.], and 320 (10%) were reported as “unsafe conditions,” which did not result in a harmful event. Fifteen reports involved temporary harm to the patient due to the following: entering wrong medication data (n = 6), administering the wrong medication (n = 3), ignoring a documented allergy (n = 2), failure to enter lab tests (n = 2), and failure to document (n = 2). Only one event report, related to a failure to properly document an allergy, involved significant harm.
"Although the vast majority of EHR-related reports did not document actual harm to the patient, analysts believe that further study of EHR-related near misses and close calls is warranted as a proactive measure."
Good Health IT ("GHIT") is defined as IT that provides a good user experience, enhances cognitive function, puts essential information as effortlessly as possible into the physician’s hands, keeps eHealthinformation secure, protects patient privacy and facilitates better practice of medicine and better outcomes.
Bad Health IT ("BHIT") is defined as IT that is ill-suited to purpose, hard to use, unreliable, loses data or provides incorrect data, causes cognitive overload, slows rather than facilitates users, lacks appropriate alerts, creates the need for hypervigilance (i.e., towards avoiding IT-related mishaps) that increases stress, is lacking in security, compromises patient privacy or otherwise demonstrates suboptimal design and/or implementation.
... Hospitals don’t report serious events if patients have been warned of the possibility of them in consent forms, said Clifford Rieders, a trial lawyer and member of the Patient Safety Authority’s board.
He said he thought one reason many hospitals don’t want to report serious events is that the law also requires that patients be informed in writing within a week of such problems. So, if a hospital doesn’t report a problem, it doesn’t have to send the patient that letter. [Thus reducing risk of litigation, and, incidentally, potentially infringing on patients' rights to legal recourse - ed.]
Rieders says the agency has allowed hospitals to determine for themselves what constitutes a serious event and the agency has failed to come up with a solid definition in six years.
Fixing this “is not a priority,” he added.
Ponder the toxic effects of too much wealth, too much power, the new culture of American investment banking, and a life conducted within the cocoon of America's new oligarchy. [p 112]
In 2010, times were getting tougher for Lancaster General Health.
The mammoth [sic] health care system would notch record revenues of nearly $1 billion that year. But its annual surplus fell for the fourth straight year. Though destitute by no means, galloping expenses and uncertainty in the marketplace were hammering LGH's business model, prompting changes. Two units were closed, some positions were eliminated, and 170 employees were reassigned.
Two executives — CEO Tom Beeman, who was on military leave part of the year, and Executive Vice President Jan Bergen, who helped fill in for Beeman in his absence — earned more than $1 million in total compensation; another six got at least $500,000.
And those top 21 executives collectively received more than $2 million in bonuses and incentives.
The IRS form lists few explicit perks, save one: LGH paid $1,044 in social club dues for Beeman in 2010.
Said Regina Mingle, LGH's executive vice president of human resources: 'In this community, if you need to do business, you do it at the Hamilton Club or Lancaster Country Club. We decided ... we would pay those fees.'
In fiscal year 2005-06, CEO Tom Beeman earned a comparatively modest total compensation of $646,094. By 2010, that had more than doubled, to $1.35 million. That figure included a base compensation of $606,728, along with $345,000 in bonuses and incentives and $279,511 in retirement and other deferred compensation.
Bergen, who along with Executive Vice President Marion A. McGowan took on some of Beeman's duties when he left in October 2010 for a nine-month military leave of absence, saw her compensation rise from $332,823 in 2005-06 to a total of $1.1 million in 2010. The latter figure included $425,967 in base pay, $177,752 in bonuses and incentives, $111,383 in retirement and other deferred compensation, and $320,208 in what the IRS calls 'other reportable compensation' such as employee contributions to 401(k) or 403(b) retirement plans.
The third highest-paid LGH executive in 2010 was McGowan, whose compensation package totaled $772,978, including $456,789 in base pay and $192,226 in bonuses and incentives. Fourth on the list was
Dr. Lee M. Duke II, senior vice president and chief physician executive, whose compensation totaled $746,830, including $405,083 in base pay and $140,377 in bonuses and incentives.
Fifth was Chief Financial Officer F. Joseph Byorick Sr., whose total compensation of $652,667 included $397,160 in base pay and $140,500 in bonuses and incentives.
In October 2010, Lancaster General Health had a problem.
Its CEO, Tom Beeman, was shipping out for a military tour of duty, to serve as deputy director of the National Intrepid Center of Excellence in Bethesda, Md. Two other administrators — Executive Vice Presidents Jan Bergen and Marion W. McGowan — would step into Beeman's shoes while he was away.
Yet Beeman stayed involved. 'We had regular Skype [video-conferencing] calls,' said Alex Henderson, chairman of the LGH Board of Trustees.
That, LGH officials believed, merited a bonus. So Beeman got nearly $90,000 for his efforts in absentia.
nonprofits must hire consultants to study how similarly sized nonprofits pay their executives.
LGH's consultant is a firm called Mercer, headquartered in New York City with an office in Philadelphia. Charlie Scott, of Mercer, has in recent years helped LGH determine what to pay its highest-compensated executives.
'Our role is to be [an] independent source of market norms,' said Scott, determining 'levels of compensation available in the market for executive positions, as well as how compensation is paid.
At LGH, officials say the generous compensation is necessary to attract and retain the top talent. Said Lancaster attorney Alex Henderson III, chairman of the Lancaster General Health board of trustees and its compensation committee, which decides what to pay top execs: 'Demand for top-notch hospital executives has grown, and we have to respond to that.'
'We're not looking to be average.'
Trustee Henderson said that as LGH's goal isn't to maximize revenue but save lives, executives can be doing a fantastic job — worthy of six-figure bonus and incentive pay — even when the system's financial performance slips.
Consider an executive who devises a way to shorten stays for patients, Henderson said: 'That's great for the patients, for insurance companies, for nurses who don't have to take care of people who don't need to be here' — but it's bad for LGH's bottom line.
Prior to joining Lancaster General Health, he served at Saint Thomas Health Services as its President and Chief Executive Officer, and the Senior Vice President for Hospital Operations and Executive Director of the Hospital of the University of Pennsylvania.
[Mercer consultant Charlie] Scott said that the law of supply and demand that applies 'to any type of talent pool applies to health care executives. There's normally a lack of supply of what's considered blue-chip talent ... [and] the increasing complexity of the health care industry requires an increasing level of talent and capability.'
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| (Left) Stretched puff in 2009. (Right) Braid-out on flat-ironed hair in mid-2012. |