"Engaging Excellence" while Engaging Secret Paychecks - The Rise and Fall of the Upstate Medical University President

Yet another leader of a big health care organization seems to have acquired the excessively entitled CEO syndrome.

Another Brilliant, Fearless Leader

When Dr David R Smith was appointed President of Upstate Medical University, a part of the State University of New York (SUNY) system located in Syracuse, he got the usual rave reviews from the school's board of trustees, according to a university press release:

'David Smith rose to national prominence through his leadership ability, experience in children’s medicine, public health policy, and as the chancellor of the Texas Tech University system. We are very pleased to have a one of the country’s foremost educators and health-care professionals lead Upstate Medical University,' said Board Chairman Thomas F. Egan. 'The State University of New York continues to enjoy an excellent record of success in attracting top academic and administrative talent from all over the country.'

'My colleagues and I are very impressed by Dr. Smith’s tremendous record of success and pleased that the Upstate Medical University search committee and University Council have brought Dr. Smith to New York. I am confident that Dr. Smith will excel as the next president of Upstate Medical Center,' said Ryan.

By 2012, Dr Smith's official presidential biography on the university web-site trumpeted,

Since coming to Central New York, Dr. Smith has reenergized the Upstate campus in a time of dwindling State resources with an aggressive program of patient revenue and research growth.

The Upstate campus has emerged as one of the true economic engines of the region. There are now over 9,200 State, research and contract jobs on campus and an all-funds budget that exceeds $1.3 billion. Dr. Smith has built upon a vigorous expansion and renewal of campus facilities with 'The Upstate Initiative' which is achieving $600 million worth of bricks-and-mortar projects. Included in that is a long-awaited repurposing of several neglected properties within the City of Syracuse.

At the start of his presidency, Dr. Smith launched the Engaging Excellence campaign as his invitation to the entire SUNY Upstate community to achieve and recognize work of the highest standard. The centerpiece of Engaging Excellence was the development of a 10-year strategic plan for purposeful campus growth.

They must have used a thesaurus to generate all those superlatives.

As we have mentioned in discussions of the outsize compensation now routinely given to the leaders of big health care organizations, the boards of trustees or directors that govern such institutions almost always seem to think their presidents and CEOs are brilliant, or at least, like the children of Lake Woebegone, above average (look here for recent example).  Such leaders usually command public relations teams whose job is to continually reinforce impressions of their brilliance.  Of course, anyone who starts an "excellence" campaign has to be excellent, doesn't he?

Yet not every leader can be above average, much less excellent or brilliant.  In fact, the need for such leaders to have public relations apparati constantly touting their excellence suggests the opposite.  

Secret Paychecks

In any case, Dr Smith thus seemed to be collecting all the usual accolades acquired by top health care leaders, and appeared poised to take on an even bigger position when it all came to a crashing halt. As reported first by the Albany (NY) Times-Union,

The president of the State University of New York's upstate medical campus ruined his chance to become the 18th president of Pennsylvania State University and has been placed on leave after SUNY leaders learned he has been padding his state pay without authorization, two state officials familiar with the matter said.

SUNY headquarters is reviewing all sources of compensation for SUNY Upstate Medical University President David R. Smith and is threatening more severe measures, according to a letter obtained by the Times Union on Tuesday.

Smith, who is based in Syracuse, was put on paid leave Tuesday.

Penn State trustees were close to announcing that Smith would be the next president at the home of the Nittany Lions, according to the people familiar with the search.

Instead, the public announcement planned for last Friday was canceled after questions about Smith's compensation in New York arose.

A search firm working for Penn State, which also works for SUNY, found out about extra pay Smith arranged through outside companies linked to his school, the people familiar with the situation said. The search firm contacted SUNY officials about Smith's additional income.

Several members of his executive team at Upstate Medical — the biggest employer in the Syracuse region — may also have been receiving unapproved extra pay from the outside companies, according to the sources.

Smith, a pediatrician, became president of Upstate Medical in 2006 after five years as chancellor of Texas Tech University. SUNY pays Smith $625,000, including $315,000 in salary plus a $60,000 housing stipend approved by the SUNY trustees, plus $250,000 from the SUNY Research Foundation. Smith is a member of the Research Foundation's board of directors.

However, in addition to that

Smith's outside money has been coming from two companies during recent years that are linked to SUNY Upstate: Medbest Medical Management Inc. and Pediatrics Service Group LLP.

Officials with the companies did not respond to emails and calls on Tuesday.

Smith's unapproved arrangements added substantially to his pay, according to a Nov. 1 letter to Smith from SUNY Chancellor Nancy Zimpher. In the letter, she alerts Smith to a recent review of his income and says he accepted $349,295 from the outside sources without Zimpher's approval.

I could not find a web-page for the Pediatric Services Group LLC. Medbest did not list Dr Smith as a member of its administrative team.

A Conflict of Interest?

As reported by the Syracuse Post-Standard, it does not appear that the interests of Upstate are precisely aligned with those of at least one of the companies that was paying Dr Smith on the side, Medbest.

Susan Kent, president of the New York State Public Employees Federation, which represents 1,430 workers at Upstate, said Upstate has been hiring non-union nurses employed by MedBest to fill jobs traditionally filled by union nurses. 'It's being done in a very sneaky backdoor fashion,' Kent said. 'We see it as their (Upstate's) way of trying to drive down wages and not use public sector workers.'

MedBest, headquartered at 251 Salina Meadows Parkway in Liverpool, provides billing and other practice management services for doctors affiliated with Upstate. It also provides staffing. On its website, the company says it employs more than 500 people.

Also,

Bobbi Stafford, a registered nurse and PEF representative at Upstate, said Upstate has been filling positions formerly held by union nurses with MedBest nurses in outpatient clinics to save money on retirement costs and other benefits. 'It's just a matter of time before they (MedBest employees) weasel their way into the hospital,' she said.

Kent said using MedBest may not be a savings to Upstate if the intent of the arrangement is to increase the pay of Upstate administrators.

The implication is that while outsourcing nursing services may cut how much the university pays nurses, the financial gain may be used as a rationale to increase payments to administrators, and not, for example, to decrease costs to patients..

Thus the revelations about the Upstate Medical University President's sources of income raise not only questions about his honesty, since he did not see fit to reveal these payments until the search firm found them, and about whether they are conflicts of interest.

Ending the "Distraction"

Supposedly to end the "distraction" causes by pondering such questions, Dr Smith just announced he will resign his executive position, according to the Albany Times-Union,

To avoid further distraction for the University from its important mission, I intend to submit my resignation as president of SUNY Upstate Medical Center, so that this great institution can move on to even greater success.

Summary

This case provides another reason to be very skeptical of the hype now that constantly emerges from health care organizations' public relations and communications departments about their managements', particularly their top managements' brilliance. Consider waiting for real results before believing in the next Excellent program to Excellently Promote Excellence.  

Furthermore, I wonder if Dr Smith had come to believe all the hype about him.  Top leaders of big organizations often seem to exist in a bubble created by people who keep telling them what they want to hear, and protect them from anything that might discomfit them.  Many of the bubble keepers are dependent on the leaders for their own exalted administrative pay.  Other bubble keepers who are members of governing boards supposedly entrusted with stewardship of the organization may want to bask in the reflected glory of a brilliant leader renowned for encouraging "excellence," and also certainly to do not want to be seen as supporting an average or mediocre leader.

In this bubble, it must be very hard not to take on a sense of entitlement.  I can only speculate that such a sense of entitlement may lead to feeling entitled to receive enough money from whatever the source to get close to the magic $1 million a year figure that CEOs now seem to regard as the minimum acceptable.

How many more examples do we need of the currently "toxic" culture that surround the leadership of health care organizations  (to borrow a term from Prof Alan Sager, look here) to motivate action to change this culture, and how such organizations are lead.  Breaking up market dominant organizations, and thus dispersing the power of their leadership, and finding ways to make leaders accountable for putting patients' and the public's health first would be true health care reform. 

Hat tip to University Diaries.

UnitedHealth's Latest Blunders Include Lax Fraud Detection, Recalled EHRs - So Why is its CEO Worth $13.9 Million, or is it $34.7 Million?

We managed to go four months since our last post about UnitedHealth, but sure enough, the company that keeps on giving... examples of poor management to contrast with ridiculous management pay... has done so again.

There were two obvious examples of poor management that recently appeared in the media.

Lax Fraud Dection

The background, as noted in a Kaiser Health News article published in September, is that it is now fashionable for American states to outsource some or most of their Medicaid health insurance programs to managed care organizations, often for-profit, as is UnitedHealth.  These programs are meant to provide insurance to the poor and disabled.  Yet once they have outsourced Medicaid, the states may be reluctant to cancel contracts, even if the outsourcing is not working:

 In Florida, a national managed care company’s former top executives were convicted in a scheme to rip off Medicaid. In Illinois, a state official concluded two Medicaid plans were providing 'abysmal' care. In Ohio, a nonprofit paid millions to settle civil fraud allegations that it failed to screen special needs children and faked data.

Despite these problems, state health agencies in these - and other states - continued to contract with the plans to provide services to patients on Medicaid, the federal-state program for the poor and disabled.

Health care experts say that’s because states are reluctant to drop Medicaid plans out of fear of leaving patients in a bind.

'You probably won’t find many examples of states flat out pulling the plug. That’s sort of the nuclear option,' said James Verdier, a senior fellow at Mathematica Policy Research, a nonpartisan think tank. 

Never mind that leaving such programs as is means taking money meant to finance care for the poor and using it to finance fraud, and reward managed care organizations for failing to find fraud.

One of the examples, but not a new one, used in the Kaiser Health News article, involved UnitedHealth:

Linda Edwards Gockel, spokeswoman for the Texas Health and Human Services Commission, said that in 2009, officials were concerned about a pilot program in the Dallas-Fort Worth area run by Evercare, a subsidiary of UnitedHealth Group. The program, which coordinated care and long-term services for elderly and disabled people, had been fined more than $600,000 for not providing proper access to care and failing to coordinate services.

Gockel said Texas decided to cancel the contract 15 months early, but continued to do business with Evercare because the problems in Dallas-Fort Worth weren’t affecting services it was providing elsewhere.

Then in July, NJ.com reported an investigation by the state of New Jersey into UnitedHealth's ability, or lack thereof, to detect fraud in the Medicaid managed care program it runs for the state.

 An HMO that earned $1.7 billion from 2009 to 2010 by providing Medicaid coverage to 350,000 low-income and disabled New Jerseyans didn't try very hard to detect fraudulent billing — identifying only $1.6 million, or one-tenth of one percent in improper payouts, according to a report the Office of the State Comptroller released today.

UnitedHealth did not even come close to fulfilling its obligations to provide sufficient resources to fight fraud:

The HMOs in the Medicaid program are required to dedicate one investigator for every 60,000 Medicaid clients. At that ratio, United's special investigations unit should have been comprised of about six employees whose sole focus is to detect fraud and abuse by medical providers and patients.

Instead, United reported it had dedicated the equivalent of two investigators during the two-year study period based on the amount of hours devoted to the unit. Upon scrutiny, the comptroller found United 'overstated' its staffing levels; the unit had one investigator, the report said. 

Note that this abject failure appeared to violate the contract UnitedHealth had with the state,

UnitedHealthcare Community Plan of New Jersey failed to hire enough investigators and train them properly, in violation of the managed care company's contract with the state, according to the report. 

Presumably, if fraud led to excess program expenses, it would be New Jersey, not UnitedHealth who ultimately had to pay them.  Again, it appears that money meant of pay for health care for the poor and disabled was diverted to fraudsters, and to revenue for UnitedHealth (partly because the latter did not see fit to spend enough money up front to detect the fraud.)  Of course, such management by UnitedHealth helped to increase its already fat revenue stream.

Faulty Electronic Health Records

In September, Bloomberg reported that UnitedHealth had to recall electronic health record software because of faults that likely increased the risk of bad patient outcomes,

UnitedHealth Group Inc has recalled software used in hospital emergency departments in more than 20 states because of an error that caused doctor’s notes about patient prescriptions to drop out of their files.

Certain versions of the software made by the largest U.S. health insurer had a bug that didn’t print information related to the medication and failed to add data to patients’ charts,according to a document filed with the U.S.Food and Drug Administration and posted July 29.

The technology is used in 35 facilities in states including California, New Jersey, and Florida, the document shows. The recall began June 21. There were no reports of patient harm and each facility was notified and received a digital fix, said Kyle Christensen, a spokesman for the UnitedHealth division that makes the Picis ED PulseCheck software that was recalled.

The incident shows how software errors can create dangers for patients at a time when digital health records are being implemented as a cornerstone of President  Barack Obams's modernization of the nation’s health-care system.

The "bug" could potentially harm patients,

 Doctor’s notes are critical for some medications, as they contain directions about diet and use. Failure to include the instructions could lead to serious injury or death, [University of Pennsylvania adjunct professor of sociology and medicine Ross] Koppel said.

It turns out that the Picis software has had other problems that could have increased the risk of harm to patients,

An online database maintained by the FDA shows that Picis Inc., a Wakefield, Massachusetts-based company that UnitedHealth acquired in 2010 for an undisclosed price, has reported six recalls involving electronic health record software since 2009.

One incident in 2011 involved anesthesia-management software sold nationwide that in one instance displayed a patient’s medical information in another patient’s file. Anotherinvolved software sold worldwide where on an unspecified number of occasions, the program failed to display the discontinued status on medication orders. Others included glitches that caused a failure to display appropriate allergy interaction warnings, the freezing of administrative controls, and other issues.

Note that it is the same Picis software that our blogger, InformaticsMD, has alleged lead to the death of his mother,

Alleged flaws in electronic health records have led to lawsuits. Scot Silverstein, a doctor and health-care informatics professor at  Drexel University, sued Abington Memorial Hospital in Pennsylvania in 2011 over the death that year of his 84-year-old mother. He blamed her death on a flaw in her electronic health record that he claims caused a critical heart medication to vanish from her file. One of the systems involved was made by Picis, according to his lawsuit. Picis is not being sued.

Linda Millevoi, a spokeswoman for Abington Memorial, declined to comment.

The latest InformaticsMD posts on this case are here and here.

Summary

These cases are just the latest in a long list of blunders and ethical missteps made by UnitedHealth and its top management.  The most significant examples of the latter about which we have posted appear in the appendix at the end.  The latest examples likely diverted money that should have supported health care for the poor, and and may have put patients' health and lives at risk.

Yet UnitedHealth is now the largest US health insurance company, and it has succeeded in making its current and former CEO fabulously wealthy.  According to filings with the US Security and Exchange Commission (SEC), its current CEO, Stephen J Hemsley, got $13.9 million in 2012, up from $13.4 million in 2011, as we posted here.  However, an analysis by the Minneapolis Star-Tribune that took into account stock gains and shares vesting suggested he got $34,721,122 in 2012, admittedly down from a breathtaking $48,075,614 in 2011. 

The previous UnitedHealth once was worth over a billion dollars due to back dated stock options, some of which he had to give back, but despite all the resulting legal actions, was still the ninth best paid CEO in the US for the first decade of the 21st century (look here).

So UnitedHealth continues to provide us with examples of how top leaders of health care organizations can become tremendously rich, despite, or perhaps because of repeated mismanagement and apparently unethical management on their watches.  Only when we make health care leaders truly accountable for their organizations, and especially for their organizations' ethics and effects on patients' and the public's health will be begin to challenge health care dysfunction.

(Note to readers recently joining us from countries other than the US - UnitedHealth is a multi-national that claims to operate in 33 countries (look here).  For example, its UK web-site is here.  So beware the export of bad management for enhanced prices.) 

 
Appendix - UnitedHealth's Ethical Lapses

 - as reported by the Hartford Courant, "UnitedHealth Group Inc., the largest U.S. health insurer, will refund $50 million to small businesses that New York state officials said were overcharged in 2006."
- UnitedHalth promised its investors it would continue to raise premiums, even if that priced increasing numbers of people out of its policies (see post here);
- UnitedHealth's acquisition of Pacificare in California allegedly lead to a "meltdown" of its claims paying mechanisms (see post here);
- UnitedHealth's acquisition of Sierra Health Services allegedly gave it a monopoly in Utah, while the company allegedly was transferring much of its revenue out of the state of Rhode Island, rather than using it to pay claims (see post here)
- UnitedHealth frequently violated Nebraska insurance laws (see post here);
- UnitedHealth settled charges that its Ingenix subsidiaries manipulation of data lead to underpaying patients who received out-of-network care (see post here).
- UnitedHealth was accused of hiding the fact that the physicians it is now employing through its Optum subsidiary in fact work for a for-profit company, not directly for their patients (see post here).

What Sorts of People are "Most Influential in Healthcare?"

Modern Healthcare just put out their list of the "100 Most Influential People in Healthcare" for 2013.  A look at what sorts of people are on this list says a lot about who runs US health care, and raises questions about who should.

Some Health Care Professionals, Lots of Hired Managers

I did some quick descriptive categorizations. (Counts were double checked but I am not guaranteeing accuracy.  Categorizations were sometimes difficult for highly diversified organizations.)

First, less than one third of list members are physicians (31% by my count).  I did not see any other health professionals on it (although I confess I did not look up the biographies of all 100).

Of these physicians, most are now functioning as hired managers, usually at the CEO level, of big health organizations.  I found only a few who could be characterized as somewhat academic: Dr Atul Gawande, professor at Harvard Medical School, Dr Eric Topol, chief academic officer at Scripps Health, Dr Harvey Fineberg, President, Institute of Medicine, Dr Brent James, chief quality officer and executive director, Institute for Health Care Delivery Research, Intermountain Healthcare,  and probably Dr Jeffrey Drazen, editor-in-chief of the New England Journal of Medicine. 

My counts of hired managers on the list included

CEOs of For-Profit Health Insurers - 5%

CEO of For-Profit Hospital Systems - 8%

CEOs of Non-Profit Hospital Systems - 21%

CEOs of Other For-Profit Care Delivery Corporations - 7%

CEOs of Drug/ Device/ Medical Supply Corporations - 2%

CEOs of Health Care Information Technology Corporations - 1%

CEOs of Non-Profit Trade Associations - 14%

CEOs and other Leaders of Professional or Medical Association - 5%

CEOs of Health Care Charities - 4%

CEOs of Other Non-Profit Organizations - 15%

Elected Government Leaders - 6%

Leaders of Government Agencies, Departments - 10%

Union Leaders - 2%

People Whose Organizations Have Issues

The list included quite a few people who lead organizations which have had issues of the sort we discuss on Health Care Renewal.  For example, the list included the following among its top 10 most influential, in order of listed influence -

4.  Stephen Hemsley, CEO of UnitedHealth Group - We have discussed concerns about his executive compensation and how it does not fit his organization's stated mission, or his organization's long list of ethical misadventures (most recently summarized here)

6. Mark Bertolini, CEO, Aetna - We most recently discussed how Aetna's leaders' pontifications on health policy seem mainly based on self-interest (here)  We also discussed various other management, ethical and legal issues.

7.  Richard Bracken, CEO, HCA - A long time ago, HCA was one of the first big health care corporations to have to make a billion dollar plus settlement for fraud, among other issues (look here).  The company has had legal, ethical, and management issues since.

8.  Joseph Swedish, CEO, WellPoint - He is new as CEO, but under previous leadership, the company amassed a record of misadventures while making its leadership very rich (summarized here, and look here for details.)

The list also included many other people whose organizations have been frequent fliers on Health Care Renewal.  For example, the CEOs of Epic Systems (ranked 13),  Tenet Healthcare (18), Cigna (20), McKesson Corp (24), Sutter Health (42), Johnson & Johnson (46), Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) (48), HealthSouth (59),  UPMC (69), and  Steward Health Care System (86).

There are many other people on the list who lead organizations that have gotten unfavorable notice on this blog, and a few whose own extreme executive compensation garnered comment.  As my science professors used to say, I leave their identification as an exercise for those interested.

Who Is Not on the List

It is interesting who is not on the list.  There are no physicians in private practice.   I would argue there are no physicians who are "pure" academics at the moment.  There are no other health care research, health policy research, or public health academics.

I saw only one person on the list (Senator Charles Grassley - R, Iowa) who has been identified with the sorts of real health care reforms we discuss here.  (Senator Grassely has investigated many instances of alleged conflicts of interest and fraud, and sponsored the Sunshine Bill to disclose better physicians' conflicts of interest.)  I do not see anyone else who in my humble opinion is identified as a dissident within the current environment. 

Many of the media accounts we have noted include people identified as experts who decried such issues as excessive executive compensation, mission-hostile management, conflicts of interest, ethical issues leading to legal settlements, or crime and corruption in health care.  None of them save Senator Grassley  are on this list. 

Summary

The Modern Healthcare list of 100 most influential people in health care demonstrates the enormous influence of hired managers in modern health care.  The vast majority of list members were hired managers.  While the list did include some physicians, most of them were currently working as hired managers.

It also demonstrates the influence of the for-profit, industrial part of health care.  It included 5 for-profit insurance CEOs, 8 for-profit hospital corporation CEOs, 7 for-profit health care delivery corporation CEOs, 2 for-profit drug/device company CEOs, and 1 for-profit health care IT CEO, a total of 23.  It also included CEOs of multiple trade associations, some of which represent the for-profit side of health care (e.g., PhRMA, America's Health Insurance Plans).  While it included leadership of many non-profit organizations as well, some of these organizations have clear financial links to the for-profit industrial side.  These ties may include significant financial support from industry, significant holdings of health care corporate stock, or managers or board members with their own relationships to industry.  (For example,  see this discussion of conflicts of interest affecting the Gates Foundation, whose co-chair is 76 on the Modern Healthcare list.)  Many of the large, non-profit hospital systems, 21 of whose CEOs are on the list, have major institutional conflicts of interest, and have many people with individual conflicts of interest among their leadership and on their boards of trustees.

As opposed to the influence of the for-profit industrial part of health care, the influence of government seems muted.  The list included only 6 politicians and 10 government managers.  Some of the politicians are notable proponents of smaller government, e.g. Senator Grassley, and specifically of a smaller role of government in health care, e.g., Governor Bobby Jindal, R, Louisiana.    Nor do unions have much influence.  Only two union leaders were on the list.  There was little counterweight provided to industrial influence from academia, and an almost complete absence of those who might question the current US status quo of dominance of health care by commercial interests. 

So here is the latest evidence that US health care is dominated by commercial interests (in an era of regulatory capture, revolving doors, and financialization) and professional, if often generic managers.  This suggests why our health care system seems more about revenue (and thus is very expensive), and less about improving patients' and the public's health.  True health care reform would require increasing the influence of people who have different priorities than the currently most influential. 

The Long Con - "Charitable" Hospitals Make Multimillionaires out of Their CEOs

The CEOs of ostensibly charitable hospitals founded to serve the poor continue to become rich.  

The latest reminders are in two articles from Maryland, from DelMarVaNow, and from the Baltimore Sun,.and one from the Boston Globe.

All this diligent reporting showed multimillion dollar executive compensation,  as usual not justified by evidence or logic, but also how executive compensation is becoming divorced from the ostensible charitable mission of non-profit hospitals.  

Most Hospital CEOs are Paid a Lot

So jin Maryland, we found via DelMarVaNow,

Peninsula Regional Medical Center paid its top executive and her immediate predecessor a total of $2.37 million in compensation in 2011 as the nonprofit hospital gained millions of dollars in profit.

In particular,

 The analysis shows that R. Alan Newberry was the third-highest paid hospital chief in Maryland, even though he has not run PRMC since 2009. In the year after formally stepping down from the hospital’s top job, Newberry received $1.57 million, about $600,000 more than he had while still working full time.

The Baltimore Sun summarized compensation given to multiple executives,

 Eleven executives earning seven-figure compensation packages including salary, bonus, retirement and other pay saw their total pay rise from as little as 0.13 percent to as much as 308 percent in the fiscal year that ended in 2012, according to tax filings. Another executive earning more than $1 million saw a pay cut.

In particular,

 The state's highest-compensated hospital executive that fiscal year was Kenneth A. Samet, the CEO of the 10-hospital MedStar Health system, who earned $6.3 million. More than half — $3.5 million — was money earned in a supplemental retirement plan during his 23 years of service. He won't get the money until he retires. His base pay was $1.2 million, and he received $1.5 million as a bonus and incentives.

The other top five highest-paid executives in Maryland are James Xinis, CEO at Calvert Memorial Hospital in Prince Frederick; Ronald A. Peterson, CEO of the Johns Hopkins Health Center Corp.; Robert A. Chrencik, CEO of the University of Maryland Medical System; and Thomas Mullen, CEO of Mercy Medical Center.

Xinis saw his compensation package jump 307.8 percent to $3.5 million, $2.8 million of which was a required distribution of vested retirement funds from a plan he begin contributing to in 2003, the hospital said in a statement. Xinis has served as CEO for 26 years and plans to retire in the next 18 months, the hospital said. His base salary in fiscal 2012 was $309,557.

Peterson, who oversees six hospitals, earned a $3.5 million compensation package. Peterson's 86.5 percent pay increase largely reflected pension benefits he'd earned during 40 years at Hopkins. His annual base salary increased about $49,500 to $1.1 million in fiscal 2012.

Chrencik, whose system has 12 hospitals, earned about $2.3 million. Chrencik's total pay grew 23.4 percent. Mercy's Mullen saw his pay rise 24 percent to $1.6 million for the fiscal year ending in 2012.

The one CEO earning more than $1 million who saw his compensation fall was Edward D. Miller, who retired in June 2012 as CEO of Johns Hopkins Medicine and dean of the university's medical school. His reported pay dropped to just over $1 million in fiscal 2012 from nearly $2.3 million the prior year, when he took a one-time retirement payout.

Also,

According to Saint Agnes tax filings, [CEO Bonnie] Phipps received $1.9 million in the 2012 fiscal year, 4.4 percent more compensation than a year earlier.

 Per the Boston Globe, local hospital executives also did really well

Chief executives at the Boston area’s largest nonprofit teaching hospitals drew pay packages of $1 million to $2.1 million in 2011, including salaries, bonuses, and compensation such as health and life insurance and retirement benefits.

Topping the list locally was Gary L. Gottlieb, chief executive of Partners HealthCare System, the state’s largest hospital and physicians organization, who received total compensation of $2.1 million in 2011, according to federal tax documents released Thursday by the nonprofits.

And,

The presidents of Partners-owned Massachusetts General and Brigham and Women’s hospitals also drew seven-figure packages in 2011, with Peter L. Slavin at Mass. General receiving a total of $1.7 million and Elizabeth G. Nabel at Brigham and Women’s a total of $1.9 million.

Also,

Tufts Medical Center reported that Ellen M. Zane, who served as chief executive through September 2011, had total pay of $1.6 million that year.

Eric J. Beyer, who took over from Zane in October, had total compensation of $744,722 that included pay for work as chief executive and at his previous job as president of the Tufts Medical Center Physicians Organization.

James Mandell, chief executive at Boston Children’s Hospital, was paid a total of $1.5 million in 2011. That was down from the $2 million he earned the prior year when he received two separate incentive awards, according to a hospital spokeswoman. Mandell plans to retire next month and will be succeeded by Sandra Fenwick, the hospital’s president and chief operating officer.

Total compensation for Boston Medical Center chief executive Kate Walsh was listed at nearly $1.4 million in 2011, an increase from $1.3 million in 2010.

At Dana-Farber Cancer Institute, chief executive Edward J. Benz Jr. received total compensation of nearly $1.3 million in 2011, up from $1.1 million in 2010.

Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center paid three different top executives in 2011.

Eric Buehrens, who served as interim chief executive from February to October, drew total compensation of just over $1 million for that role and other executive jobs.

The Justification for this Pay is Stereotyped (and not Supported by Logic or Evidence)

The Usual Talking Points

The articles in combination provided the usual talking points as justification.  It seems nearly every attempt made to defend the outsize compensation given hospital and health system executives involves the same arguments, thus suggesting they are talking points, possibly crafted as a public relations ploy.   We first listed the talking points here, and then provided additional examples of their use here, here here, here, here, and here..   

They are:
- We have to pay competitive rates
- We have to pay enough to retain at least competent executives, given how hard it is to be an executive
- Our executives are not merely competitive, but brilliant.

As we have noted before, there is little evidence in support of these talking points.  What evidence there is on the topic suggests there is no real free market in interchangeable CEOs, and that CEOs are not very mobile, especially not across different kinds of organizations (look here).  There is little evidence that hospital (or other health care) executives are particularly brilliant, or any more brilliant than multitudes of physicians, nurses, and other health care professionals who work hard to make their institutions run.

True to form, the reporting from Maryland and Boston found that defenders of executive pay cited the talking points, but without any further logic or evidence. 

Competition

Re PRMC (from DelMarVaNow),

 'We’ve looked at about 17 like institutions. Eight are smaller than we are; eight are larger. Every hospital is different, so you have to always take into account there’s some variation, but we’ve always stayed in the middle. Our goal has been to stay in that 60 percent level as far as compensation goes,' said Martin Neat, chairman of PRMC’s board of directors, which oversees executives’ salaries.­

Note that in this case, no justification was provided for constantly setting the CEOs pay above the median.


Re Maryland, via the Baltimore Sun

 Hospitals argue that they have to offer competitive compensation to attract talent to run a complicated business.

Re Maryland and particularly UMMS, via the Sun,

 The medical institutions say they hire independent consultants and look at the pay of executives at comparable health systems when making their decisions.

Also,

UMMS hospital executives are compensated in line with national benchmarks,' [UMMS spokeswoman Mary Lynn] Carver said.

Note that there was no justification for the comparability of these institutions, or why a national versus regional comparison was made.

Retention

Re PRMC

 Above all, PRMC’s board of directors seeks to ensure that the hospital attracts and retains the best leaders.

Note that there was no evidence given that current leaders might leave were their compensation reduced.

 Brilliance

Re PRMC,

[Board Chairman Neat]  added: 'These are high-paid positions, but these are very capable people who could go elsewhere.'

Re Maryland, from the Baltimore Sun

 Executives need to understand everything from the latest health technologies to regulatory changes, including health reform.

So do doctors and nurses, so why do they not not get similar pay?

Also,

 [Carmela Coyle, CEO of the Maryland Hospital Association, said,] 'Hospital executives are in charge of incredibly complex organizations,' she said. 'They are organizations that are open 24 hours a day and are highly regulated. These are really difficult, difficult jobs'.

Note again the lack of comparison with the doctors and nurses who must staff the hospitals 24 hours a day, and make difficult decisions while caring for patients with sometimes life-threatening conditions.  How often does a hospital CEO get a call in the middle of the night, and how often does it require a decision in a life-and-death situation?

Re Mercy Medical Center,

 'As a result of Mr. Mullen's leadership, vision and skillful stewardship, Mercy has been an economic engine for the city, infusing additional jobs into the local economy,' the hospital said in a statement.

When in doubt, use the v (for visionary) word.  Note that this begs the questions of how many other people were responsible for the economic benefits, and whether such benefits, rather than, say ability to provide good care to patients, should be the main consideration.

Should Brilliance be Measured by Revenue?

At best, some defenders of high CEO pay seem to argue that the main measure of CEO brilliance ought to be their hospitals' financial performance. For example, the DelMarvaNow article included,

Fiscal health is one of the most important considerations in determining [new CEO Peggy] Naleppa's pay, [board chairman] Neat said. 

Also, he was quoted,

'There's no question that the financial performance of the institution is going to affect what you're going to pay', Neat said.

While,

Nationwide, hospital boards subscribe to a similar philosophy.  Financial health was cited by 100 percent of multi-hospital organizations in a 2006 survey as a factor in determining bosses' incentive plans.

Similarly, the Baltimore Sun quoted Dr Stephen F Jencks, "who serves on the board of the cost review commission,"

executives should be judged by whether they are running cost-efficient organizations

However, CEO pay seems to increase even at financially challenged institutions,  as the Baltimore Sun noted,

The CEO pay question — always a hot-button issue — is generating debate again this year after a state panel spurned a push by hospitals for higher rates, instead approving smaller increases and calling on them to do more to curb expenses. Hospitals have sought rate increases in each of the past three years, and this year at least one Baltimore-area hospital responded with layoffs in an effort to trim labor costs.

So,

'If they are laying off staff and decreasing what they invest in the community and executive compensation is increasing, that is a real question,' said Jessica Curtis, project director of the hospital accountability project at Community Catalyst, a national advocacy group that promotes wider access to affordable health care.

Even if one accepts that the compensation of leaders of organizations that take care of sick and injured patients ought to mainly depend on the brilliance of their leadership as measured by how much money the organizations make, rather than the quality of that care, it is not clear that all these leaders are brilliant in that sense.

The Charitable Mission and CEO Compensation

Essentially all US non-profit hospitals and hospital systems have a history of a charitable mission to improve the health of their patients and communities, even if that means taking care of poor people who cannot pay for these services.  Nearly all justify their legal status as non-profit corporations by stating this mission. 

For example, Peninsula Regional Medical Center, the main subject of the DelMarVaNow article, describes its mission thus in its US tax filing,

Peninsula Regional Medical Center is a not-for-profit 501 (c) 3 non-stock corporation founded in 1897 to serve the health care needs of the community.  The Hospital's primary purpose is to provide the highest [sic] primary, secondary, and selected tertiary health care services to residents of and visitors to the Mid-Delmarva Peninsula in a competent, compassionate, and cost effective manner designed to elicit a high degree of consumer satisfaction.  The Hospital's mission is to improve the health of the communities we serve....

Yet it appears that this mission is honored mainly in the breach, at least when it comes to CEO compensation. 

The DelMarVaNow article emphasized that hospitals' charitable functions are not seen as relevant by hospital boards when setting CEO compensation,

Despite the nonprofit status of the organizations they oversee, hospital boards don't appear to put weight toward the amount of free medical services and community outreach activities, good deeds collectively known as charity care, [executive vice president of Integrated Healthcare Strategies Kevin] Talbot

Also,

The head of the consulting firm that helps PRMC's board establish [current CEO] Naleppa's pay said community benefit shouldn't be part of the equation.

'In my over 25 years of consulting on hospital compensation, I have never seen community benefit used as a factor in determining executive pay,' Rian Yaffe said.  'Community benefit has nothing to do with how difficult a hospital is to manage and lead.'

However, community benefit is the mission of the hospital, and is justification for most US hospitals' non-profit status, which allows them to escape certain kinds of taxation, and for donors to make charitable, tax-advantaged contributions to the hospitals.  

The Baltimore Sun listed financial but not charitable performance as a justification for the compensation of a particular executive, the CEO of Johns Hopkins Medical Center, who is

'held responsible for stringent qualitative measures,'  in such areas as financial performance, patient safety and service excellence, [Johns Hopkins] spokeswoman Kim Hoppe said in a statement.

When asked by the Sun to comment, the advocacy group Community Catalyst stated

One of the factors that should be considered, it says, is the role of non-profit hospitals in the community and in providing charity care. 

Meanwhile, while the hospitals gain advantages from ostensibly focused on the mission of providing community care and benefit, not only are there leaders not given incentives to uphold this mission, they are explicitly compared to leaders of for-profit organizations who have no such missions, and who are primarily tasked with increasing short term revenue in this era of "financialization." 

In the Baltimore Sun,

Hospitals note that they compete with private sector businesses where their executives could choose to work instead.

Again, as noted above, there is little evidence that top hired managers are really that mobile, and less that a manager from one sector, e.g., non-profit hospitals, would be in great demand in another, e.g., a for-profit corporation.

The Boston Globe noted an argument made that implied no one should complain about how much non-profit hospital executives make, since executives of for-profit corporations make even more.

 'In a big successful teaching hospital, it’s very rare to see anything less than $1 million in total compensation for the chief executive, and $1.5 million to $2 million is the norm,' [managing director of consulting firm Compensation Resources Paul R] Dorf said. 'Executives at publicly traded pharma or medical device companies can make 10 times as much.'

So if there is little evidence for the mobility of top hired managers, there is less for the desirability of managers of non-profit hospitals as heads of large pharmaceutical or medical device companies.  But furthermore, in trying to justify, albeit illogically, outsize CEO compensation, the defenders of this compensation have provided evidence that the leaders and stewards of non-profit hospitals may no longer care about the hospitals' fundamental mission.  This suggests that hospitals' overt declarations of their mission, especially when used to obtain more donations and tax benefits, may amount to the ethical equivalent of a "long con," that is, a long-term confidence scheme.


Summary

While F Scott Fitzgerald noted that the very rich are different from you and me, it may now be more appropriate to say that top hired managers are very different from you and me.  Again and again we see that they play by very different sets of rules than do other people who work in health care.  Notably, while they often emphasize cost cutting, and may be quick to lay off or outsource other employees, their compensation increases year by year no matter how well their organizations are doing.  While other employees, increasingly now including doctors as well as other health care professionals, have to answer to the hired managers, the hired managers only answer to boards of directors or trustees who often act like their cronies, perhaps because they are often also current or retired hired managers.

Hired managers are subject to incentives that seem designed not to improve patients' and the public's health, but at best to improve the short-term revenue of health care organizations, and at worst to increase the wealth of hired managers.  Such perverse incentives risk promoting ill-considered, mission-hostile, or even corrupt management.  The sorts of people who aspire to be hired managers in such conditions are likely not the sort of people one would expect to really advance the health of patients or of the population.

As a first step to restoring health care leadership to some state of reasonable accountability and responsibility, we need to challenge the rules that only hired managers play by.  It would be nice to see articles in the media about health care CEO compensation that at least attempt to question the usual talking points.  All of us could think about how we could challenge our local million dollar plus hospital CEOs to justify why they should be treated so differently from all other hospital employees.

Since it seems that many hospitals no longer fit at least the spirit of the definition of not-for-profit organizations, even though they use this designation for financial advantage, we need policies to encourage them to uphold their mission, and that provide negative consequences if they do not. 

Should We Cry for Non-Profit Hospital System CEOs Paid Less than For-Profit CEOs?

Two recent articles (here and here) in Modern Healthcare providing an update on the compensation of CEOs of non-profit hospital systems raised new questions.

The CEOs' Compensation

The first article documented the rich compensation of the top paid CEOs of non-profit US hospital systems.  A summary of their total compensation:

-  Donald Faulk (now retired), Central Georgia Health System - $8 million
-  George Halvorson, Kaiser Permanente - $7.9 million
-  Jeffrey Romoff, UPMC - $6.1 million
 -  Pat Fry, Sutter Health - $5.2 million
-  Gregory Beier (retired), Novant Health  - $5.1 million
-  Dr Steve Safyer, Montefiore Medical Center - $5 million
-  David Bernd, Sentara - $4.6 million

The Usual Talking Points

The articles in combination provided the usual talking points as justification for this compensation.   We have noted that nearly every attempt made to defend the outsize compensation given hospital and health system executives involves the same talking points.   We first listed the talking points here, and then provided additional examples of their use here, here here, here and here.   They are:
- We have to pay competitive rates
- We have to pay enough to retain at least competent executives, given how hard it is to be an executive
- Our executives are not merely competitive, but brilliant.

So true to form, we found in the Modern Healthcare articles these justifications of the executives multimillion dollar pay.

Competition

In general,

In interviews, health system directors and executives at the systems where these top-paid executives work defended the compensation packages as necessary to remain competitive....

Re UPMC

UPMC spokeswoman Susan Manko described his [that is, Romoff's] pay as competitive for an institution of UPMC's size and complexity. 

Re Novant

Novant spokeswoman Kati Everett said Novant follows IRS rules that call for pay to be compared against the market....

Re Sutter

[Sutter Health board of trustees member and chair of the compensation committee Andy] Pansini said the Sutter board set the CEO's salary halfway between the lowest and the highest amount he could earn elsewhere.

Also,

He said Sutter's board relies heavily on consultants to compare Fry's compensation against the market.

Retention

 Re Sentara

'Mr Bernd's compensation takes into account his 40-year tenure of leadership at Sentara, with nearly 20 serving as the organization's top executives.

Brilliance

Re Novant

[Novant spokeswoman Kati Everett said] 'At Novant Health, we recognize (that) our responsibility to serve our community depends on the caliber of talent in our workforce, our leadership group....'

Re Sentara

[CEO Bernd's] 'pay reflects his experience, expertise....'

Re Sutter

[Pansini] defended [CEO] Fry's compensation as reasonable and necessary to meet Sutter's strategic goals by hiring a skilled executive team. 

Explicit Comparison to For-Profit Corporations

The articles also introduced one new element.  Some defenders of non-profit hospital CEO compensation explicitly argued that should take into account compensation of for-profit CEOs.

This argument was made by "Jill Horwitz, a law professor at the University of California at Los Angeles,' who had "defended paying not-for-profit healthcare executives market rates."

She also noted that not-for-profit systems have to compete with the for-profit sector for top talent. 'This idea that people should be donating their labor is a misunderstanding of charity.'

Defenders of CEO compensation at specific health systems also made similar points.  For example, a Kaiser Permanente spokesman explicitly compared his CEO's pay to that given to CEOs of for-profit health plans,

Kaiser spokesman Won Ha, in a written statement, said Halvorson's pay falls short of the average compensation of $14 million, not including option exercises, earned by CEOs of the 12 largest for-profit healthcare systems, which had average 2011 revenue of $37 billion.

'Compensation paid to senior management is substantially less than that of many for-profit health (plans),...'

Also, re Sutter,

[board committee chair Pansini noted that when comparing his CEO's pay against the market] That comparison includes other executives of similar not-for-profit health systems, and to a lesser degree, of for-profit systems.

 Summary: An Extension, but Still no Clear Justification for the Talking Points


The talking points to explain executive compensation in health care are used again and again.  They never seem to be publicly challenged.  However, they should raise some obvious questions.

The argument about competition raises several obvious questions.  Why should the top hired managers' pay be only compared to other top managers, and not explicitly to other employees?  Even if the comparison is restricted to other top managers, how can they be used for those at the top of the pay scale for non-profit hospital system CEOs?  How these CEOs' compensation could be dubbed merely competitive, much less "halfway between the lowest and highest amount he could earn elsewhere," is not clear.

The retention argument begs the questions of whether any of these managers is really likely to leave, whether they really would be attractive to other organizations at the same or even higher pay, and whether it would really be difficult to find replacements.

The brilliance argument raises the question of how brilliance is defined.  Given that it is almost unheard of for a fan of current compensation practices to dub any top manager anything less than brilliant, the obvious question is how can CEOs, like the children of Lake Woebegone, all be above average? 

 Furthermore, the talking points seem to be in the process of extension, which should raise even more questions.

Defenders of CEO pay, usually "spokespeople" or members of boards of trustees, often cite the need for "competitive" pay.  They usually are not clear about with whom they are competing.  Now it seems to be more popular to say that non-profit health care organizations are competing with for-profit corporations, despite the ostensible difference in their natures.  Non-profits are supposed to have a charitable nature and function, to have some sort of mission that serves the greater good.  To support that apparently benevolent purpose, in the US they are exempt from certain taxes, are are able to receive charitable contributions which in turn earn deductions for their givers.  For-profit corporations are in business ostensibly for their owners. 


In addition, by now asserting that the non-profit CEOs should be likened to the CEOs of for-profit corporations, the expanded talking points highlight questions that have been raised about how these hired managers are paid. We have previously discussed some pithy critiques of American practices of executive compensation (look here and here.)

CEO compensation as a multiple of the pay of the average worker has risen 10-fold since the 1960s (see this chart). As a consequence, the top 1% and 0.1% of the US income distribution is increasingly and disproportionately made up of executives, that is hired managers, (see the recent article by Bivens and Mishel[1] for a summary).  Per the article, the income of top corporate executives has grown even faster than that of other members of the top 0.1%.  It seems evident that these rates of growth cannot be explained by increases in the financial performance of their companies.  Furthermore, while it appears that compensation of US health care corporate executives has grown as fast as their brethren, there is no data that US health care has improved at anything like a similar rate.  It may have hardly improved at all.  A recent JAMA article is just the latest example of studies showing that US health is lagging that of other developed countries, although the US spends far more per capita on health care.(2)     

Furthermore, there is more and more criticism about how the compensation of top hired managers is set.  Steve Denning's blog  post in Forbes summarized a 2012 Harvard Business Review article(3) suggesting that "market-based" compensation schemes mistake top managers for innovative entrepreneurs, when they are mainly simply "bureaucrats"; reward managers for luck rather than skill; and is "inversely related to shareholder returns."

Finally, Elson and Ferrere critiqued the mechanics of how compensation is set.  In particular, while boards of directors may attend to data on compensation of CEOs at other, supposedly comparable corporations, they almost always "choose a package that is in the 50th, 75th, or 90th percentile of their target peer group.  Targeting levels below the 50th percentile is rarely, if ever done."  Thus, boards nearly always act as if their CEO is above average, while by definition, most CEOs cannot be above average.  Why do boards commit this folly?  The authors postulated that suggesting the CEO is less than average "may raise concerns over the executive's position within the company...."  Perhaps boards also fear that labeling the CEO below average may be an admission of below average governance. 

Desai suggested that the perverse incentives created by current schemes to compensate managers were a major cause of the 2008 financial meltdown.  As Dennings wrote,

despite the constraints to change, the overcompensation of the C-suite and the financial sector is not sustainable. It causes serious misallocation of capital and talent, repeated governance crises, rising income inequality and an overall decline of the US economy. It obviously cannot continue, if only because, as Margaret Thatcher used to say in a different context, 'Sooner or later you run out of other people’s money'

Clearly, in the health care context, the results could be even worse.  Perverse executive compensation could not only lead to misallocation of capital and talent in health care, it could lead to bad health care decisions that could harm patients' and the public's health.  However, there seems to be almost no discussion of, much less research about, much less policy changes addressing perverse incentives for health care managers and their likely ruinously bad effects on people and patients.

Such discussion and research is a prerequisite to true health care reform, which would require such policy changes.

Meanwhile, I hope at least the next time huge compensation of some health care managers is announced, someone asks the next set of questions after the usual talking points are made.  

Roy M. Poses MD in Health Care Renewal

References
1.  Bivens J, Mishel L. The pay of corporate executives and financial professionals as evidence of rents in top 1 percent incomes.  J Econ Perspect 2013; 27: 57-78.
2. US Burden of Disease Collaborative.  The state of US health, 1990-2010 burden of diseases, injuries, and risk factors.  JAMA 2013; 310: 591-608.  Link here.
3. Desai M. The incentive bubble.  Harvard Business Review, March 2012. 

Johnson and Johnson Settles Suit Alleging Management Incompetence and Deception, Managers Continue to Prosper

Very quietly, pharmaceutical/ biotechnology/ medical device corporate giant Johnson & Johnson just settled another lawsuit. The most pithy version is by Ed Silverman on Pharmalot, although Reuters and Bloomberg published short accounts.

The New Settlement

Per Mr Silverman, the gist is:

The health care giant agreed to resolve the dispute brought over allegations that J&J management shirked their responsibilities and allowed a chain of events that resulted in congressional probes; lost market share, consumer confidence and revenue, and a consent decree with the FDA. In the lawsuit, a shareholder charged that J&J bungled the integration of the Pfizer consumer health acquisition, placed inexperienced execs in charges of its OTC unit and cut costs so drastically that quality control suffered.

The lawsuit, which was brought by Ronald Monk, alleged that the health care giant made misleading statements about its products before disclosing problems with the Fort Washington plant and another in Puerto Rico. He also maintained that J&J withheld material information before its decision three years ago to shut down the Fort Washington plant, where contamination led to the unpublicized recall of defective Motrin tablets in 2009.

In agreeing to the settlement, J&J refused to admit any wrongdoing

So let me review. The allegations in this case were all about problems with the management of Johnson and Johnson.  They included allegations that management was incompetent and deceptive.  The incompetence was in handling the core functions of the company, assuring that its drug products were pure and unadulterated.  The deception was of patients, the public, and the nominal owners of the company to whom management is supposed to report, and allegedly included an attempt to cover up concerns about the purity of its drug products.

The proposed settlement follows the current practice of allowing the defendant not to admit the allegations, leaving their truth unproven.  However, one wonders, given that the allegations are about the core responsibilities of management and were leveled by the company owners, why the management would not defend their honor more forthrightly.

The Company's Sorry Legal Record

Furthermore, this settlement also follows the current practice of being made without reference to any other seemingly relevant legal proceedings.  In fact, it is just the latest of a long string of settlements and other resolutions of legal actions, including guilty pleas, by Johnson and Johnson management.  As we summarized most recently here, these included:

- Convictions in two different states in 2010 for misleading marketing of Risperdal
- A guilty plea for misbranding Topamax in 2010
- Guilty pleas to bribery in Europe in 2011 by Johnson and Johnson's DePuy subsidiary
- A guilty plea for marketing Risperdal for unapproved uses in 2011 (see this link for all of the above)

- A guilty plea to misbranding Natrecor by J+J subsidiary Scios (see post here)
- In 2012, testimony in a trial of allegations of unethical marketing of the drug Risperdal (risperidone) by the Janssen subsidiary revealed a systemic, deceptive stealth marketing campaign that fostered suppression of research whose results were unfavorable to the company, ghostwriting, the use of key opinion leaders as marketers in the guise of academics and professionals, and intimidation of whistleblowers. After these revelations, the company abruptly settled the case (see post here).
-  Also in 2012,  Johnson & Johnson was fined $1.1 billion by a judge in Arkansas for deceiving patients and physicians again about Risperdal (look here).
-  Also in 2012, Johnson & Johnson announced it would pay $181 million to resolve claims of deceptive advertising again about Risperdal (see this post).

Even though the record includes a number of settlement in which management did not have to admit guilt, the company has made a surprising number of guilty pleas in just the last few years.  Despite all this evidence of poor, that is incompetent or unethical management, Johnson and Johnson managers have been getting very rich.

As we mentioned here, Mr William Weldon, the outgoing CEO on whose watch most of the misbehavior resulting in the legal actions above occurred, retired with a huge retirement package, after receiving extremely generous compensation prior to that.  The new CEO as of April, 2012,  Mr  Alex Gorsky, per the company's 2013 proxy statement, already owns more than 190,000 Johnson and Johnson shares,  and received $10,977,109  total compensation in 2012.  Mr Weldon received over $29 million in total compensation just for 2012, the year in which he retired.  Other top executives received from over $3.5 million to over $8 million. 

Summary

So why do the stockholders, the owners of Johnson and Johnson continue to pay so much to an executive team on whose watch so many bad things have happened?  Why did law enforcement authorities allow the company to continue to plead guilty or settle cases without imposing any negative consequences on these executives?  Maybe only the Shadow knows. Of course, the lack of any discussion beyond that on Health Care Renewal, that puts each new settlement or guilty plea in the context of the ones before, and juxtaposes them to the rewards of given to management, may not help. 

As we said the last time we addressed the contrast between Johnson and Johnson's sorry legal record and its voluminous payments to executives, we have noted again and again and again that many of largest and once proud health care organizations now have recent records of repeated, egregious ethical lapses. Not only have their leaders have nearly all avoided penalties, but they have become extremely rich while their companies have so misbehaved.

These leaders seem to have become like nobility, able to extract money from lesser folk, while remaining entirely unaccountable for bad results of their reigns. We can see from this case that health care organizations' leadership's nobility overlaps with the supposed "royalty" of the leaders of big financial firms, none of whom have gone to jail after the global financial collapse, great recession, and ongoing international financial disaster (look here). The current fashion of punishing behavior within health care organization with fines and agreements to behave better in the future appears to be more law enforcement theatre than serious deterrent.  As Massachusetts Governor Deval Patrick exhorted his fellow Democrats, I exhort state, federal (and international, for that  matter) law enforcement to "grow a backbone" and go after the people who were responsible for and most profited from the ongoing ethical debacle in health care.

As we have said before, true health care reform would make leaders of health care organization accountable for their organizations' bad behavior.

A "Simply Outstanding," "Superb" Hospital CEO Cops a Plea to Two Felonies

In all the discussions of what is wrong with US health care, very rarely is the quality of the leadership of health care organizations questioned.  In fact, no major US health care organization seems to have leadership that is anything short of brilliant.  The amazing brilliance of these leaders serves as a rationale for the ever increasing compensation that they receive.  Yet while subordinates, friendly members of boards of trustees, and hard working public relations flacks may stress their leaders' wondrous qualities, there rarely is an opportunity to compare their proclamations with results.

A few small items in the New York media provide us one case study of how these proclamations may not square with reality.

Background

In 2005, the CEO of New York's renowned Hospital for Special Surgery announced his retirement.  In a hospital news release, we find these pronouncements about outgoing President and CEO John Reynolds,

HSS board Co-Chairman Aldo Papone said, 'John's guidance and devotion to the Hospital for Special Surgery these last two decades have been simply outstanding. Under his watch, the quality of care, fiscal health and scope of treatment for musculoskeletal disease at the hospital have reached the highest level in its history.  While we regret his decision, we can only offer a most grateful expression of thanks...'

Also, HSS board Co-Chairman Dean R. O'Hare said,

He is a superb leader and we appreciate his thoughtful approach to succession which is emblematic of his service to HSS.

I cannot find anything on the internet about Mr Reynolds' compensation prior to his retirement, but in 2006, after he took on the position of Co-CEO during the transition, a copy of the hospital's 2006 990 form filed with the US Internal Revenue service, (and still available here, note though that rather confusingly, the Hospital still files under its archaic original name, "The New York Society for the Relief of the Ruptured and Crippled,") showed that Mr Renynolds' total compensation was $1,310,603

The CEO as Crook

Nothing publicly appeared to challenge the notion that Mr Reynolds' leadership was less that "outstanding" and "superb" until a Bloomberg article in September, 2012,

.

John R. Reynolds, former chief executive officer of New York's Hospital for Special Surgery, was charged by federal prosecutors with taking $1.4 million in a decade-long illegal-kickback scheme.

Reynolds, 63, was arrested at his home in Massachusetts this morning, according to a statement from the office of U.S. Attorney Preet Bharara. An indictment unsealed today in Manhattan federal court charges Reynolds with racketeering and making false statements to the government. He faces as long as 25 years in prison if convicted.

Prosecutors claim that, from 1996 to 2007, Reynolds took money from at least two hospital vendors, a hospital employee and an unidentified health-care organization in the U.K.

Furthermore,

 The government claims Reynolds took a total of $420,000 in kickbacks from at least two hospital vendors, from 1996 to 2002, in exchange for steering hospital business to them. From 2000 to 2005, he extorted an additional $298,500 from a subordinate at the hospital after negotiating an annual bonus for the employee, according to the charges. Reynolds also received $670,000 for approving a clinical partnership between his hospital and the U.K. health-care organization, prosecutors claim.


Reynolds is also charged with lying in 2008 to an agent of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services inspector general’s office.

'By allegedly exploiting his position at the helm of a world renowned hospital for his own personal gain, John Reynolds tarnished the hospital’s reputation and did a disservice to its employees,' Bharara said in the statement.

Not surprisingly,

 'Obviously, it was a shock to us,' said Deborah Sale, a hospital spokeswoman, referring to the charges.

Of course, in the US, people accused of crimes are assumed to be innocent until proven guilty.  So I am now writing about this case because yesterday Bloomberg published the follow up story,

The former chief executive officer of New York’s Hospital for Special Surgery, charged by federal prosecutors with taking $1.4 million in kickbacks, pleaded guilty to two felonies. 

John R. Reynolds, 64, today pleaded guilty to wire fraud and making false statements, admitting that he took payments from a hospital employee and lied to investigators about it.

He will be subject to a stiff fine, although less than what he was charged with extracting through his scheme, and may be imprisoned,

 Under a plea agreement with the government, Reynolds will forfeit $718,500. Both sides agreed that federal sentencing guidelines, which are advisory, call for him to serve 27 to 33 months in prison.

The story so far has also been covered briefly by two tabloids, the New York Post, and the Daily News.  To date, the Hospital for Special Surgery has not issued a news bulletin on this.

Summary

So yet another "outstanding," "superb" multimillion dollar CEO turned out to be something rather less, in  fact, to be a criminal.


We have frequently discussed how the leaders of large US health care organizations are often hailed as brilliant, and compensated hugely for their brilliance, but rarely publicly subject to any objective assessment of their performance.  In many cases, they seem unaccountable for leadership that may be ill-informed, hostile to the health care mission, or even criminal or corrupt.

 The good news is that this criminal was eventually caught.  The bad news is that it only happened 18 years after he began acting criminally, hardly an example of swift justice.  One wonders how many other brilliant health care leaders will years later turn out not to be so, and how many others' performance will never be publicly assessed.  

While we breathlessly await the rigorous prospective study that assesses public assessments of the leaders of large health care organizations against objective results, we are stuck with case studies as a means to do so.  This case study shows a particularly stark contrast between the public relations puffery and the sordid reality. 


Instead of "brilliant" leaders paid like royalty, we would do better with competently collegial leaders rewarded reasonably as part of a team all focused on the health care mission, which puts service to patients first.  As long as health care organizations appear to be a path to riches for their leaders, expect the people who want to lead them to be more interested in their own fortunes than patients' and the public's health.  As long as health care professionals, policy makers and the public assume that those who lead health care organizations are fully qualified, fairly paid, and always do what is right, expect the insiders to continue to run things for their own profit. 

The qualifications of those who would lead health care, how much they are paid, what they are doing and what the results of their work are ought to be publicly known and publicly discussed.  Health care professionals, policy makers, and the public should demand nothing less.  . 

No Blues, but Lots of Green for St Louis Hospital System CEOs

A recent article in the St Louis Post Dispatch provided the latest examples of how hospital executive compensation continues to defy gravity.  In summary,

In recent years, executives at St. Louis-area nonprofit health organizations have seen annual double-digit increases of as much as 40 percent in their total compensation packages, which typically include salaries, bonuses, pensions and health benefits.

Such pay hikes occurred as these nonprofit organizations enjoyed their largest operating margins in years,...

The examples include...

BJC Healthcare

Steven Lipstein, president and chief executive of St. Louis-based BJC Healthcare, received a total compensation package of about $3.3 million in 2011, the latest year currently available per BJC’s tax filings. That’s a 40 percent hike over his compensation of $2.3 million in 2010. A year earlier, he received a 4 percent increase.

In particular,

 According to BJC’s 990 tax filing, Lipstein’s 2011 compensation of $3,279,956 included a base salary of $920,576; bonuses and incentive pay of $2,213,555; other compensation of $15,733; deferred compensation of $99,651; and $30,441 in 'nontaxable benefits.'

Also,

Five BJC executives received total compensation packages in 2011 exceeding $1 million.

For comparison, note that

The health system paid about $1.7 billion in salaries and benefits in 2011 to its 28,559 employees — an overall increase of nearly 5 percent over its labor costs in 2010, when it had about 250 fewer employees.

So Mr Lipstein's compensation rose much faster than the system's total labor costs.  Also,

 BJC employees — which include a spectrum of jobs from administrators, physicians and nurses to medical technicians, office workers and supply clerks — earn annual salaries and benefits on average totaling about $58,343. Lipstein’s pay package of $3.3 million for 2011 was 56 times greater than the average BJC employee’s compensation.

So the CEOs compensation was much larger than that of the average employee, and seems to have risen much faster.

SSM Health Care

William Thompson... [is] chief executive of Creve Coeur-based SSM Health Care, which operates 18 hospitals in four states. He received total compensation of $2.3 million in 2011 — a 26 percent increase over 2010.

Some of that pay hike was attributable to a change in jobs. Thompson, SSM’s former chief operating officer, assumed the role of chief executive in August 2011. In 2010, his pay increased 95 percent from $918,229 to $1.8 million.

Ascension Health Alliance

 Anthony Tersigni, chief executive of Ascension Health Alliance, received total compensation in fiscal year 2012 of $4 million — a 12 percent increase over the previous year. A year earlier, he received a 6.5 percent increase over the previous year in his former role as chief executive of Ascension Health. 

In addition,

 Nine executives at Ascension’s headquarters received total compensation in fiscal year 2012 exceeding $1 million.

Mercy Health

Lynn Britton, chief executive of Mercy, received $2.2 million in total compensation in fiscal year 2012 — a 15 percent increase over 2011. A year earlier, he received an 18 percent increase.  

And,

Five current and former Mercy executives received total compensation in fiscal year 2012 exceeding $1 million.

Myra Aubuchon, a former Mercy senior vice president who left the health system in 2010, received a payout in fiscal year 2011 of $3.4 million for retirement benefits, severance and other compensation. In fiscal year 2012, she received an additional $405,339 in compensation.

Mercy executives are provided additional perquisites, including first class and charter travel on Mercy’s aircraft and the opportunity at times for their spouses to accompany them to business and other events. Executives and staff fly to and from some business meetings in Mercy’s midsize corporate jet, a Rockwell Sabreliner. 

The Usual Talking Points

So all CEOs of the St Louis area's bigger non-profit health care systems made more than $1 million, often several  times that.  Most of the systems had multiple other hired executives who made at least $1 million.  Often executives received other perks far beyond anything received by other employees, such as travel on corporate jet aircraft.  

We have noted that nearly every attempt made to defend the outsize compensation given hospital and health system executives involves the same talking points.   We first listed the talking points here, and then provided additional examples of their use here, here here, and here.   They are:
- We have to pay competitive rates
-  We have to pay enough to retain at least competent executives, given how hard it is to be an executive
-  Our executives are not merely competitive, but brilliant.

The Post-Dispatch article provided more examples of these stereotypical justifications.

Competitive Rates

 The SSM CEO actually seemed to make such an argument to justify his own pay,

'I’ve been (at SSM) for 33 years, and for a lot of those years I wasn’t paid nearly the salary I’m paid now,' Thompson said. 'If you look at the revenue, I don’t think I’m over- or underpaid.'

He provided no data to support is argument.

And again,

Salaries and benefits for nonprofit health executives 'need to be competitive if we are going to be able to attract the talent needed to run these very complex organizations,' he said.

How that talent was defined was not apparent.

The chief of  public relations of Ascension Health Alliance added,

 [Chief advocacy and communications officer Jon] Glaudemans said that Ascension is seeking “to remain competitive in a market that is increasingly complex and characterized by challenging regulatory circumstances, including implementation of the Affordable Care Act.”

From the senior vice president for human resources for Mercy Health, Cynthia Mercer, we had this contribution,

'We’re competing for the same pool for talent,' Mercer said. 'It’s difficult to secure talent. ...'

She did not provide a definition of talent either.  Note that she also said,

We feel that it’s very important as a ministry to be just in our approach, respecting the dignity of each of our co-workers regardless of their position.  

She did not explain the justice provided by the top executives' use of private corporate aircraft and the free travel provided to their spouses.

Retention

An example came from the chief PR flack from Ascension,

'We are required to be competitive, but we also have a mission to care for those who are poor and vulnerable. Candidly, many of our executives could do better for themselves working in other environments.'

He did not give evidence that his or any other local executives were in great demand in such other environments.  He certainly did not try to reconcile how an organization with a mission to care for "the poor and vulnerable" was making a multimillionaire out of its CEO.

Brilliance

The chief public relations flack at Ascension Health Alliance provided this example,

'When we look for leadership of our ministry, we need to draw from the best and brightest to serve those who are poor and vulnerable,' said Jon Glaudemans,...

Whether his use of the term "best and brightest" was meant to be an ironic allusion to the leaders who lead the US into the controversial and bloody Viet-Nam War was not clear.

In response to the first Post Dispatch article, a physician, self-described as " a 40-year veteran of Washington University Medical School and BJC hospitals," wrote a letter in Mr Lipstein's defense.  To prove the CEO's brilliance, Dr Robert G Levitt gave him personal credit for a number of accomplishments, such as addressing readmissions for congestive heart failure patients, and avoiding outbreaks of multidrug resistant bacteria in intensive care units, that seem to be more likely to have resulted from diligent work by health professionals.  He praised Lipstein for actually "respond[ing] to emails from physicians and staff," which hardly seems brilliant.  Finally, he noted "BJC has not laid off workers as other St. Louis hospital systems have done to save costs."

It only took three days for that point to be proven wrong, as the St Louis Post-Dispatch then reported, "BJC Healthcare began on Wednesday laying off 160 employees, the first layoffs in the company’s 20-year history."  Per the St Louis Business Journal, these layoffs may include at least some "direct patient care staff," that is, e.g., nurses, and were due to declining revenue. 

Summary

The St Louis Post Dispatch main article on CEO pay opened thus,

Trimming medical costs is the latest mantra among hospital executives, government bureaucrats, insurers and benefit managers as they grapple for ways to contain U.S. health care spending.But executive compensation in the health care industry shows few signs of hitting a ceiling. 

It included comments by Professor Harold Miller of the Center for Healthcare Quality Payment and Reform and Carnegie-Mellon University,

'But if a health care executive’s pay is based on the amount of revenue they generate, the problem is in the incentive,” he said. “Basically, hospitals get rewarded by putting more heads in beds. It works against the goal of affordable health care. We need to start paying these executives to keep people healthy.'

And he noted the danger is,

when executives start chasing their own compensation rather than the good of the company. We’ve seen that in banking, and that can happen in health care

I would argue that this is already what is going on. Non-profit organizations whose missions include taking care of poor people pay their top executives millions of dollars. We have yet to see any logical, evidence-based justifications for such generous and ever rising compensation.  This compensation is increasingly out of proportion to what other employees are paid   Their compensation may rise even when their organizations' finances are challenged (see the example of the BJC layoffs above).  Nearly all rationalizations of their compensation are made by people whose jobs depend on the executives they are defending (as above), or by other hired executives who may be eager to defend their brethren. 

As long as hired executives chase compensation rather than uphold the health care mission, expect their personal fortunes to increase, and the mission to wither.

We await  true health care reform which would ensure health care organizational leadership that puts upholding the health care mission ahead of lining their pockets.  .