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Selasa, 03 Desember 2013

How Manipulated Clinical Evidence Could Distort Guidelines - the Case of Statins for Primary Prevention

The new American College of Cardiology (ACC)/ American Heart Association (AHA) guidelines on the primary prevention of cardiovascular disease, which we discussed here, continue to generate controversy. 

Articles in the media and online-first in medical journals underscored some of the issues we discussed before.  Jeanne Lenzer, in a news article in the British Medical Journal, found that the chair of the guideline panel had important past conflicts of interest that were not previously disclosed.(1)  The chair denied their significance (look here).   Guideline panel members continued to justify their efforts, but in my humble opinion, raised no new evidence or logic to support it (look here  and here)

Bigger Questions about the Validity of the Clinical Evidence

However, several new articles suggested the need for a deeper look at one particular aspect of this case, the validity of the evidence from clinical research about the benefits and harms of statins for primary prevention.

JAMA published a summary of the Cochrane review that provided a basis for the guideline developers' confidence in the worth of statin therapy in primary prevention.(2)

results suggest that the benefits of statin therapy outweigh serious life-threatening hazards.

However, almost as an aside, it noted,

Some trials included participants with CVD, but rather than exclude these trials, we included trials that contained 10% or fewer participants with documented CVD.

Primary prevention in this case is defined as prevention for patients without existing cardiovascular disease.  There is evidence that statins may well have benefits that outweigh harms when given to patients with known cardiovascular disease, particularly documented coronary artery disease (CAD).  Mixing such patients in any numbers into "primary prevention trials" would likely exaggerate the benefits of statins.  Yet such not quite primary prevention studies were included in a systematic review of primary prevention. 

In addition, a commentary by one of the guideline developers defending the group's work also underscored the fact that many of the supposedly primary prevention trials they used as evidence were not pure primary prevention trials.(3)


Notably, the 2013 cholesterol guideline cut points were derived from the placebo rates for myocardial infarction, stroke, and cardiovascular disease death observed in the 3 exclusively primary prevention statin trials, Air Force/Texas Coronary Atherosclerosis Prevention Study (AFCAPS/TexCAPS), Management of Elevated Cholesterol in the Primary Prevention Group of Adult Japanese (MEGA) study, and the Justification for the Use of Statins in Primary Prevention: an Intervention Trial Evaluating Rosuvastatin (JUPITER).[4-6]

The wording again suggests that all the other trials used as evidence about primary prevention were NOT "exclusively primary prevention studies," and hence, as I noted above, may have been biased so that they would likely exaggerate the apparent benefits of statins in primary prevention.

This suggested to me that the systematic review that provided a basis for the guidelines' aggressive recommendations about statins for primary prevention, and the trials on which it was based needed further skeptical, critical reviews.

The Cochrane Review: Was Evidence about Statin Benefits vs Harms Manipulated?

We have frequently discussed the manipulation of clinical research.  By that we have meant design, implementation, analysis or dissemination of research in ways likely to further vested interests.  In particular, when drug, biotechnology and device companies sponsor and control clinical research on their own products, they may set up the research in ways likely to make their products look better than they actually are.  

We looked through the most recent Cochrane review of statins for primary prevention(7) with a skeptical eye out for suggestions that the trials reviewed could have been so manipulated.  We found quite a bit.

First, we found that not all trials reported on the "hard" outcomes that one needs to consider when evaluating benefit vs harm of statins in primary prevention.


Data on all-cause mortality were provided in 11 trials.[of 19, and hence missing in 8].

And,

 Twelve trials provided data on adverse events.[and hence 7 did not.]

 Also, data on specific adverse events was often not reported: myalgia and rhabdomyolysis were reported in only 9/19 trials; new onset diabetes mellitus in only 2/18; hemmorhagic stroke in only 2/19; abnormal liver tests in only 10/19; kidney dysfunction in only 4/19; arthritis in only 2/19, and by implication, cognitive dysfunction in 0/19.  

  Failure to look for all the possible bad outcomes of treatment could obviously bias the study in the direction of minimizing the harms of the treatment.

A substantial number of trials either failed to report on crucial aspects of their methods, or admitted to flaws that could have induced important biases.: 3/19 did not described randomization methods; 4/19 did not use double-blinding; 6/19 did not use intention to treat analysis; 7/19 did not report their drop-out rates.

So it is very surprising to me that the authors concluded,


In general there was low risk of bias ... though all trials were either fully or partially funded by pharmaceutical companies.
In my humble opinion, the Cochrane review showed many trials that had flaws could have biased their outcomes, and hence the outcomes of the overall review.  Some of the flaws clearly could have lead to biases that would have made statins look more efficacious, or less dangerous than they might actually be.  I do not understand the conclusion that the risk of bias was slow, and the lack of discussion about the direction the bias could have taken.

 Review of the "3 Exclusively Primary Prevention Statin Trials"

Given the Cochrane review's apparent lack of skepticism about methodologic problems in the industry funded statin prevention trials, I endeavored to take a closer look at the three trials that Dr Robinson held out as the real primary prevention trials.  Instances of manipulation, as we defined it above, for each trial are described below

AFCAPS/ TexCAPS(4)

Narrow Patient Population - This study excluded many patient for whom the statins were not contraindicated or warned against: uncontrolled hypertension; type 1 or type 2 diabetes mellitus on insulin or with a HgBA1C at least 10%; and body weight more than 50% "desirable limit for height."  (Based on the official contraindications and warnings for commonly used statins, e.g., see contraindications for Lipitor here, active liver disease, pregnancy for likely to become pregnant, nursing mothers, hypersensitivity to the medicine; and warnings: use of cyclosprine or strong CYP3A4 inhibitors, uncontrolled hypothyroidism, renal impairment.)  Thus the results may not generalize to many patients who would otherwise be considered statin candidates.  By excluding such patients, the results may bias the study towards minimizing the probabilities of harms that might occur were statins used on a wide population for primary prevention.

Unknown Randomization and Allocation Concealment Procedures - According to the Cochrane Review, the study report did not explain how randomization or allocation concealment were accomplished.  

Early Termination/ Multiple Comparisons - The study was terminated early based on an early look at the number of outcome events.  Two such early or interim analyses were planned.  Taking multiple looks at the data over time raises a multiple comparisons problem, and may lead to exaggerating the benefits of the treatment.(8). Furthermore, stopping early decreases the sample size and hence the power to find adverse effects of treatment.

Implausible Dropout Rate, Missing Data - According to the Cochrane Review, the study reported no dropouts.  This seems somewhat improbable, suggesting skepticism about the accuracy and completeness of the data collection.  On the other hand, a study chronology suggests that of 6605 patients who started the study, 6540 had data on complete endpoint status, suggesting missing data.  Since dropouts and missing data may be due to different reasons in different arms of the study, they threaten the validity of data about benefits and harms.  

Adverse Effects not Reported - The study provided no data about development of diabetes, hemmorhagic stroke, kidney dysfunction, arthritis, or cognitive dysfunction, suggesting incomplete data about harms, and hence bias towards minimizing harms.    

MEGA (5)

Narrow Patient Population -  [The patient population was not described in the main report, but only in an earlier methods article.](9)  The study excluded patients with congenital or rheumatic heart disease; chronic atrial fibrillation, current diagnosis of malignancy; poorly controlled hypertension or diabetes mellitus; current use of oral or parenteral corticosteroids; and other conditions at the discretion of the physician.  These exclusions seem unrelated to the contraindications or warnings on the stain label.  Again, such a narrow patient population reduces the generalizability of the study results, and may bias the study to minimizing the harms of statins.

Only Single Blind - This was an open-label study, so patients and physicians knew who got statins and who got placebo.  Such knowledge could have biased patient management, including how diligently particular diagnoses and outcomes were pursued, and biased data collected from patients or physicians.

Adverse Effects Not Reported - The study provided no data about diabetes, hemmorhagic stroke, kidney dysfunction, arthritis, or cognitive dysfunction, again suggesting bias towards minimizing harms.  

JUPITER(6)

Narrow, Unusual Patient Population - The study was limited to patients without hyperlipidemia but with an increased C-reactive protein.  Thus it is not clear that its results would generalize to a more typically defined primary prevention population.  The study excluded patients receiving post-menopausal hormone-replacement; with diabetes; uncontrolled hyertension; cancer other than non-melanoma skin cancer within 5 years; recent history of drug or alcohol abuse; "another medical condition that might compromise safety or the successful completion of the study;" also patients with "inflammatory conditions such as severe arthritis, lupus, or inflammatory bowel disease...;" and also "patients taking immunosuppressant agents such as cyclosporine, tacrolimus, azathioprine, or long-term oral glucocorticoids."  Again, this narrow patient population would reduce generalizability and bias towards minimizing harms.

Early Termination/ Multiple Comparisons - This study was terminated early after an early look at the data.  Allowing for multiple looks at the data may exaggerate efficacy.  

Implausible Dropout Rate - According to the Cochrane Review, the study had no dropouts.  This value seems implausible, again suggesting data collection problems.  

Adverse Effects Not Reported - The study provided no data about hemmorhagic stroke, arthritis, or cognitive dysfunction, again suggesting bias towards minimizing harms.  [Revised December 9, 2013 - see comment below by Marilyn Mann.]

Summary

Aspects of the continuing controversy over the new ACC/ AHA guidelines for statins in the primary prevention of cardiovascular disease hinted that the clinical trials which provided the evidentiary basis for the guidelines, and for the use of statins in primary prevention in general, was more flawed than is widely appreciated.  The latest Cochrane Collaboration review of this data acknowledged multiple, important flaws affecting most of the studies.  Our more detailed review of the three studies held out as the purest found additional flaws.  Many of these flaws seemed likely to bias the studies towards exaggerating the efficacy and/or minimizing the harms of statins in primary prevention.  Since all these trials were funded, and presumably influenced by pharmaceutical companies that make statins, these flaws seem to be examples of manipulation of the clinical evidence.  Rather than being the result of simple mistakes, or inevitable trade-offs, they seem to be study features intended the support the vested interests of the study sponsors.

It is not clear why the Cochrane review did not temper its conclusions based on the flaws in the studies, and particularly by the possibility that these flaws represented study manipulation.  

The multiple flaws, possibly due to study manipulation, in the clinical evidence about statins in primary prevention suggest that we should be extremely skeptical about whether the benefits of such treatment outweighs its harms, and hence about whether the recommendations in the latest guidelines to give statins to all patients predicted (but perhaps not accurately) to be at even slightly elevated risk are warranted.

The flaws in multiple large studies of a very common clinical problem, and their effects on systematic reviews and clinical practice guidelines suggest that suppression and manipulation of research are rife in medicine and health care, presumably fueled by the pervasive web of conflicts of interest that spans health care.  We need extreme skepticism about the integrity of clinical research, especially research sponsored by those whose products and services are being studied, and who thus have vested interests in the research turning out to make their products and services look good.  

The good news is that we may not have to look too far to find ways to improve the trustworthiness of guidelines and the soundness of medical decision making.  Implementation of the Institute of Medicine's recommendations on reducing conflicts of interest (look here), and developing trustworthy guidelines (look here) might lead to the development of sound guidelines in the future.  

Furthermore, while endless discoveries of manipulated and suppressed research may have lead some evidence-based medicine advocates to despair, our latest exercise suggests that the principles of evidence-based medicine, unflinchingly applied, could really do good.  Review of the three statin studies above based on standard principles of critical review readily spotted the multiple signs of manipulation.  The problem with the Cochrane review was not that it missed these signs.  Rather, the reviewers for some reason noted most of them, but then did not react.  If systematic reviews were done with sufficient skepticism about the possibility of manipulation of clinical research, and were willing to call out when the emperor seemed short on fabric, then a lot of mischief could be avoided.  


References

1.  Lenzer J. Majority of panelists on controversial new cholesterol guideline have current or recent ties to drug manufacturers.  Brit Med J 2013.  Link here

2.  Taylor FC, Huffman M, Shah E. Statin therapy for primary prevention of cardiovascular disease.  JAMA 2013.  Link here.  

3.  Robinson JG.  Accumulating evidence for statins in primary prevention.  JAMA 2013;  Link here.

4.    Downs  JR, Clearfield  M, Weis  S,  et al; for the AFCAPS/TexCAPS Research Group.  Primary prevention of acute coronary events with lovastatin in men and women with average cholesterol levels: results of AFCAPS/TexCAPS. JAMA. 1998;279(20):1615-1622. Link here
5.  Nakamura  H, Arakawa  K, Itakura  H,  et al; MEGA Study Group.  Primary prevention of cardiovascular disease with pravastatin in Japan (MEGA study): a prospective randomised controlled trial. Lancet. 2006;368(9542):1155-1163. Link here.

6.  Ridker  PM, Danielson  E, Fonseca  FA,  et al; JUPITER Study Group.  Rosuvastatin to prevent vascular events in men and women with elevated C-reactive protein. N Engl J Med. 2008;359(21):2195-2207. Link here

7.  Taylor F,  Huffman MD, Macedo AF et al.  Statins for the prevention of cardiovascular disease. Cochrane Library 2013.  Link here.

8. Mueller PS, Montori VM, Bassler D et al.  Ethical issues in stopping randomized trials early because of apparent benefit.  Ann Intern Med 2007; 146: 878-881.  Link here.  

9.  Management of Elevated Cholesterol in the Primary Prevention Group of the Adult Japanese (MEGA) Study Group.  Design and baseline characteristics of a study of primary prevention of coronary events with pravastatin among Japanese with mildly elevated cholesterol levels.  Circ J  2004; 68: 860-867.  Link here.

Jumat, 22 November 2013

Confused Thinking about New Cholesterol Guidelines - Were Conflicts of Interest to Blame?

For years, clinical practice guidelines promulgated by prominent health care organizations have been hailed with accolades as received wisdom.  However, there is increasing reason to be skeptical of such guidelines.  Many guidelines are not based on rigorous application of the principles of evidence-based medicine, and often seem to arise from the personal opinions of their authors.  This is particularly troublesome when those authors  have conflicts of interest, and when the organizations that sponsor guideline development have institutional conflicts of interest.  Back in 2011, an Institute of Medicine panel advocated standards for guideline development, including strict limits on conflicted panel members, to make their results more trustworthy.  However, as we noted here, those standards have been largely ignored.   

Therefore, it is good news that the just released, long awaited guidelines on the treatment of blood cholesterol from the American College of Cardiology (ACC) and American Heart Association (AHA)(1)  they provoked controversy rather than adulation.  However, connecting some dots reveals that the guideline development process and the defenses of the guidelines by its developers were even more confused than they first seemed.  That confusion may be explained by conflicts of interest affecting guideline development of the sort that the IOM report wanted eliminated.  .


The New Cholesterol Guidelines - Background

A striking feature of the guidelines was a new approach to drug treatment for primary prevention, that is, for patients who do not already have heart disease or other atherosclerosis.   Such drug based primary prevention has been controversial, although drug treatment for people with high cholesterol who also have documented coronary heart disease, secondary prevention, is well-established.

The new cholesterol treatment guideline suggested drug treatment, essentially limited to statin medications, for patients believed to be at elevated risk of developing coronary artery disease or other forms of atherosclerotic disease, even in the absence of elevated cholesterol levels.  

Adults 40 to 75 years of age with LDL–C [so called "bad cholesterol"] ]70 to 189 mg/dL, without clinical ASCVD* [atherosclerotic cardiovascular disease] or diabetes and an estimated 10-year ASCVD risk ≥7.5% should be treated with moderate- to high-intensity statin therapy.

Also,

It is reasonable to offer treatment with a moderate intensity statin to adults 40 to 75 years of age, with LDL–C 70 to 189 mg/dL, without clinical ASCVD* or diabetes and an estimated 10-year ASCVD risk of 5% to [less than] ... 7.5% 

Previously, guidelines and other recommendations for the treatment of cholesterol for primary prevention, that is, for patients without known atherosclerotic cardiovascular disease, suggested treatments according to the level of cholesterol or its components.  

Less controversially, the guidelines recommended treatment for patients with existing ASCVD, very high LDL-C, and diabetes.

The new guidelines raise some  questions:
- Given the past controversy, how good is the evidence supporting cholesterol lowering drug treatment in primary prevention?
- What is the evidence supporting deciding on drug treatment for primary prevention on predicted risk of atherosclerotic cardiovascular disease?
- Can physicians make good enough risk predictions to use this approach?

Evidence Supporting Drug Treatment of Cholesterol in Primary Prevention - Do Benefits Outweigh Harms?

The reason that cholesterol lowering drug use for primary prevention has been controversial is the lack of clear evidence that such drug use leads to benefits to patients that outweigh its harms.  A central principle of evidence based medicine is that only treatments whose benefits clearly outweigh their harms should be prescribed.  .

A recent commentary by Abramson et al in the British Medical Journal in October, 2013 outlines the issues.(2)  There is no good evidence that statins used in primary prevention increase overall survival, or decrease overall incidence of adverse events, defined as death, hospital admission, prolongation of admission, cancer or permanent disability.

Individual trials and meta-analyses do show that statins lead to a small reduction in the rate of cardiovascular events.  For example, the authors' re-analysis of data from a patient level meta-analysis showed that of 140 low-risk primary prevention patients treated for five years, one patient would avoid a major coronary event or stroke.

However, it is not clear that this small likelihood of benefit offsets the likelihood of adverse events due to treatment.  The data about the harms of statins in primary prevention is not very clear, partially because the relevant randomized controlled trials featured "reporting of adverse events ... [that was] generally poor, 'with failure to provide details of severity and type of adverse events or to report on health-related quality of life."

In summary, Abramson et al wrote,

statin therapy prevents one serious cardiovascular event per 140 low risk people (five year risk ... [less than] 10%) treated for five years.  Statin therapy in low risk people does not reduce all cause mortality or serious illness and has about an 18% risk of causing side effects that range from minor and reversible to serious and irreversible.  Broadening the recommendations in cholesterol lowering guidelines to include statin therapy for low risk individuals will unnecessarily increase the incidence of adverse effects without providing overall health benefit.

However, the new guideline focused on the ability of statins to prevent ASCVD, 

The RCTs identified in the systematic evidence review indicated a consistent reduction in ASCVD events
from 3-hydroxy-3-methylglutaryl-coenzyme A reductase inhibitors (statins) therapy in secondary and primary prevention populations....
However, the new guideline ignored the absence of evidence that statin treatment prolonged life, prevented serious illness overall, or improved health status, function or quality of life.

Furthermore, the guideline seemed unreasonably optimistic about the harms of statins.  In particular, it ignored evidence about harms other than diabetes, myopathy (serious muscle disease), and stroke.  Yet there is evidence suggesting that statins at least might cause "liver dysfunction, acute renal failure, and cataracts; cognitive symptoms, neuropathy, and sexual dsyfunction; decreased energy and exertional fatigue; and psychiatric symptoms, including depression, memory loss, confusion, and aggressive reactions" as summarized by Abramson and colleagues.

Thus the new guidelines did not make a new and improved case that statin treatment for primary prevention has benefits that outweigh its harms.  One could argue that this is their fatal flaw and thus all the rest of the guidelines' discussion about which patients should get primary prevention was pointless.

Dr Abramson and his co-author, Dr Rita Redberg, did get to repeat their arguments about why statin use for primary prevention is not justified in a NY Times op-ed, but otherwise the fundamental problem with the guideline's argument for aggressive use of statins went unnoticed.

Evidence Supporting Making Decisions about Statin Treatment as Primary Prevention According to Patients' Risks of Developing Atherosclerotic Cardiovascular Disease

The guidelines suggested statin therapy for patients judged to have at least a 7.5% risk of ASCVD.  As noted above, there is no evidence that statin therapy in primary prevention in general increases survival, reduces serious events overall, improves health status, quality of life, or function, or has benefits that clearly outweigh its harms.  I could not find any reference in the guidelines to clear evidence about the effects of statin treatment in primary prevention for this sub-group of patients. 

In the supplemental guideline on risk assessment,(3) there was this 

After deliberation, the Work Group endorsed the existing and widely employed paradigm of matching the intensity of preventive efforts with the individual’s absolute risk.. The Work Group acknowledges that none of the risk assessment tools or novel risk markers examined in the present document have been formally evaluated in randomized controlled trials of screening strategies with clinical events as outcomes.

The wording is confusing, but might be stating that a strategy of using statins only for patients predicted to have a risk greater than 7.5% has not been assessed in a clinical trial.  (It might also, however, be stating that the specific method recommended by the guideline to assess this risk has never been tested in a clinical trial, see below.)

The apparent lack of evidence in support of the specific strategy advocated by the guideline to use statins for primary prevention in patients whose risk of ASCVD exceeded the designated threshold did not otherwise attract any notice.

Evidence Supporting the Ability of Physicians to Assess Risk of ASCVD Accurately Enough to Implement the Recommended Strategy


The supplemental guideline stated that previously published methods of risk prediction would not be suitable for the new proposed approach,

As part of its deliberations, the Work Group considered previously published risk scores with validation in NHLBI cohort data as 1 possible approach. However, a number of persistent concerns with existing risk equations were identified including nonrepresentative or historically dated populations, limited ethnic diversity, narrowly defined endpoints, endpoints influenced by provider preferences (e.g., revascularizations), and endpoints with poor reliability (e.g., angina and heart failure [HF]). 

Since the recommended strategy requires an estimation of risk, the lack of availability of acceptable risk assessment methods would appear to be another fatal flaw.  However, 

Given the inherent limitations of existing scores, the Work Group judged that a new risk score was needed to address some of the deficiencies of existing scores, such as utilizing a population sample that approaches, to the degree possible, the ideal sample for algorithm development and closely represents the U.S. population.


So the question now becomes: did the guideline provide sufficient evidence that the new risk prediction tool developed as part of guideline development predicts sufficiently well to be used to make decisions as recommended by the guidelines?

Note that developing, validating, and publishing a new risk score normally would be considered to be tasks that are part of research, not guideline development.  Nonetheless, the guideline developers decided to take on these tasks as part of guideline development, which precluded independent publication of the the results of this research after peer review.  This makes it more difficult for others to critically evaluate the results of the research concerning the new risk score.  But let me attempt to do so.

The work group went ahead to develop a new multivariate prediction model for ASCVD.  This means they used statistical methods to find variables, that is, patients' clinical or demographic characteristics, that independently could predict the outcome of interest, and then combined these variables in an equation (or algorithm) to make risk predictions for individual patients.  Such multivariate models to make diagnoses or, as in this case, prognostic predictions have been the subject of considerable research since at least the 1970s.  However, they have not been as useful as their initial advocates hoped.

The issues turn out to be a bit complex.  I must digress into an area in which I previously did research.

It is quite easy to develop multivariate diagnostic or prediction models.  The statistical analytic tools can almost always find multiple patient characteristics that independently correlate with the outcome of interest.  The problem is that such correlations can be based on random associations, or biases produced by idiosyncrasies in the particular data set used for model development.  That a new model can diagnose or predict accurately for patients who were not in the original data set thus is not assured, and should be considered to be merely a hypothesis.

Models developed on one group of patients often do not work when tried prospectively on new patients, probably because the initial development group was somehow not completely representative of all the patients of interest.  For example, a model may have been developed using patients from a particular hospital which attracts different sorts of patients than found in other hospitals in which the model might be used.  .Therefore, before one has confidence in such a multivariate model, one must verify that the model predicted or diagnosed well not only in the group of patients from which it was derived, but prospectively on other patients like those on whom it would be used in clinical practice.

The supplemental guidelines did assert that the new model was prospectively tested,

 The equations were also assessed in external validation studies using data from other available cohorts

However, it did not specify what these cohorts were.

There is some data buried in Appendix 4 of the supplemental guideline on the performance of the model.  They did not distinguish results from derived from prospective validation from those from model derivation.

 In summary, discrimination and calibration of the models were very good. C statistics ranged from a low of 0.713  (African-American men) to a high of 0.818 (African-American women). Calibration chi-square statistics ranged from a low of 4.86 (nonHispanic White men) to a high of 7.25 (African-American women).

These two sentences do not provide strong evidence that the model would predict well when used prospectively.

The C-statistic is an overall measure of the ability of the model to discriminate between patients who will go on to develop the diseases of interest and those who will not.  The statistic is formally equal to the probability that were two patients, one who developed disease, and another who did not, selected randomly, the model would predict disease more strongly for the patient who actually got it.  Thus, at best, for 20% of random pairs of African-American women, one who got disease, one who did not, the model would give a more pessimistic prediction for the women who would not get disease.  This is good, but not great discrimination ability.  (If this result referred to data from model derivation, not prospective validation, it is likely to be over-optimistic.)

Furthermore, since the guideline would be used to make decisions based on the absolute risk, its calibration is also important.  Calibration is the measure of whether the model predictions of risk are close to reality.  To assess calibration, one ought to assess the whole range of predictions made by the model.  Given that the guidelines suggest a 7.5% risk threshold, it would be particularly important to determine whether patients given predictions above and below that value really have risks above and below that value.

Unfortunately, the two sentences above are not helpful in this regard.  The chi-square statistic presented is a measure of overall calibration, but does not show calibration for groups of patients given predictions with particularly interesting values, like above or below 7.5%

Note that the supplemental guideline on risk assessment includes a statement that details about the model validation done "internally and externally" are in a Full Panel Report Data Supplement.  The download of that supplement so far does not seem to work

Setting that aside for a moment, the published guidelines do not provide good evidence that the risk prediction tool the guidelines recommend should be used to assess ASCVD risk in order to make decisions on statin use for individual patients in primary prevention. The lack of a sufficiently accurate method to predict risk seems to a fatal flaw for a strategy that requires risk prediction.

Controversy in the Media

It turns out that I was not the first person to identify this problem. In fact, it appears that during the internal review process for the guidelines, major questions had already been raised about the risk prediction model's calibration. However, these questions did not seem to have been conveyed to the guideline authors, and hence were never addressed.

As reported by the New York Times on November 17, 2013,

The problems were identified by two Harvard Medical School professors whose findings will be published Tuesday in a commentary in The Lancet, a major medical journal. The professors, Dr. Paul M. Ridker and Dr. Nancy Cook, had pointed out the problems a year earlier when the National Institutes of Health’s National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute, which originally was developing the guidelines, sent a draft to each professor independently to review. Both reported back that the calculator was not working among the populations it was tested on by the guideline makers.

That was unfortunate because the committee thought the researchers had been given the professors’ responses, said Dr. Donald Lloyd-Jones, co-chairman of the guidelines task force and chairman of the department of preventive medicine  at Northwestern University.

The article by Ridker and Cook was indeed published. on November 19, 2013(4).  It suggested major problems with the calibration of the risk assessment model,

Another concern for clinicians is whether the new prediction algorithm created by the ACC/AHA correctly assesses the level of vascular risk. To be useful, prediction models must not only discriminate between individuals with and without disease, but must also calibrate well so that predicted risk estimates match as closely as possible the observed risk in external populations. We calculated predicted 10-year risks of the same atherosclerotic events using the new ACC/AHA risk prediction algorithm and compared these estimates with observed event rates in three large-scale primary prevention cohorts, the Women's Health Study, the Physicians' Health Study, and the Women's Health Initiative Observational Study.

As shown in figure 1, in all three of these primary prevention cohorts, the new ACC/AHA risk prediction algorithm systematically overestimated observed risks by 75–150%, roughly doubling the actual observed risk. As shown in figure 2, similar overestimation of risk was observed in two external validation cohorts used by the guideline developers themselves, an issue readily acknowledged in the report. Thus, on the basis of data from these five external validation cohorts, it is possible that as many as 40–50% of the 33 million middle-aged Americans targeted by the new ACC/AHA guidelines for statin therapy do not actually have risk thresholds that exceed the 7·5% threshold suggested for treatment. Miscalibration to this extent should be reconciled and addressed in additional external validation cohorts before these new prediction models are widely implemented. It is possible, for example, that the five external validation cohorts are more contemporary than the cohorts used in the risk prediction algorithm and thus reflect secular improvements in overall health and lifestyle patterns in the USA over the past 25 years.

Note that Figure 1 of the Ridker and Cook article showed the calibration of the model in the patient cohorts newly tested by these authors, focusing in particular on whether patients predicted to have risks of cardiovascular disease just over the 7.5% threshold actually had rates of such disease greater than 7.5%.  They clearly did not   Note also that Figure 2 showed calibration of the model when the guideline authors attempted to test it on new patient cohorts, apparently the data found in the so far inaccessible Full Panel Report Data Supplement.  Again, the model overestimated risk for patients just over the crucial threshold.

So the guideline developers knew that their model overestimated risk, buried this information in supplemental data, did not admit or perhaps appreciate how it threatened the credibility of their guidelines, and somehow were not given the internal review that suggested this was a fatal flaw of the proposed guidelines . 

The Guideline Developers' Responses

The media controversy over the accuracy of the prediction model incorporated into the new guidelines provoked responses from the guideline developers, but these responses were at best confused.  .  

First, as reported by the NY times,

In a response on Sunday, Dr. [Sidney C] Smith of the guidelines committee said the concerns raised by Dr. Cook and Dr. Ridker 'merit attention.'

But, he continued, 'a lot of people put a lot of thought into how can we identify people who can benefit from therapy.' Further, said Dr. Smith, who is also a professor of medicine at the University of North Carolina and a past president of the American Heart Association, 'What we have come forward with represents the best efforts of people who have been working for five years.'

Note that this response includes two logical fallacies.  First, it contained a straw man argument.  It appeared to respond to accusations no one made.  Nobody accused the guideline developers of being lazy, not putting in much effort, or not devoting much thought to the effort.  The response also included an implied appeal to authority: big experts came up with these guidelines so their opinions should be credited, even in the presence of data to the contrary.  

Also, as reported by CNN,
However, 'I can't speak to whether the calculator is valid or not,' Dr. Robert Eckel, co-chair of the American Heart Association committee that wrote the new guidelines and the association's past president, told CNN. 'That needs to be determined.'

'We trusted that the calculator worked,' he said. 'We trusted that the calculator is valid.'

This was confusing.  Maybe Dr Eckel meant it to be another appeal to authority, the authority in question being that of the work group that developed the risk prediction model. 

Furthermore, again according to CNN,

Researchers apparently did not receive the professors' responses, Dr. Donald Lloyd-Jones, chairman of the committee that developed the equation, told the Times.
 
But Lloyd-Jones told reporters Monday, 'There's nothing wrong with these equations.'

Committee members were aware there could be 'overestimation of risk in some populations,' he said.

In addition,

 'Our risk assessment guideline doesn't tell you what to do. ... It just evaluates risk,' he said.

I am not sure this even rises to the level of a logical fallacy.  It appears to be pure denial.  The whole point of the risk assessment tool was to determine whether a patient's risk is above or below the thresholds suggested by the treatment guideline, and thus to tell you what to do.  There clearly is something wrong with "these equations."  Using them appears to vastly overestimate risk, and thus implementation of the guideline would probably lead to vast over treatment of real people  .

Thus, after promulgating guidelines that seemed hardly based on evidence, when challenged, the guideline developers' response was confused and illogical.   

What About the Issue of Benefits versus Harms?

The other problems that I identified above, lack of evidence that primary prevention provides benefits that clearly outweigh harms, and lack of evidence that a strategy based on risk assessment would provide benefits that outweighs harms, did not get media coverage, and so did not provoke a response from the developers.  However, I  did find that one of the members of the guideline panel implied her approach to the benefits versus harms issue in a Medscape news article.   Dr Noel Bairey Merz gave a talk at the 2013 American Heart Association meeting about primary prevention for women, first saying

Although the randomized clinical trial evidence supporting primary prevention with statin therapy in women is not perfect, 'the absence of data means negative data.'

That is the argument formulated by Dr Noel Bairey Merz (Cedars Sinai Medical Center, Los Angeles, CA), who spoke today here at the American Heart Association 2013 Scientific Sessions.  

'How confident are we that statins do not save lives in the week before a heart attack, but they do save lives the week after a heart attack, for women and men?'

Also,

in the overall JUPITER study of 18 000 patients, there was no treatment benefit when women were studied as a subgroup. Merz argues that JUPITER is powered for the total sample size only, not for women alone. In addition, the statistical test for heterogeneity revealed the interaction by sex was not statistically significant.

'Pretty much all the subgroups fall beyond the statistically significant range,' said Merz. 'So should we withhold treatment for women, who now are the majority of victims of cardiovascular disease, because of low precision and a trial that was not designed to address or answer this question?'

So Dr Merz seemed to assume that statins work for particular patients in the absence of evidence that they do not work, maybe implying a general assumption that all treatments are beneficial until proven otherwise.  This stands a central precept of evidence-based medicine, and perhaps the ancient dictum to physicians to do no harm, on their heads.


Unwarranted Enthusiasm for (Over) Treatment and Conflicts of Interest

The new cholesterol guidelines, and those who developed them, seem enthused about the treatment of cholesterol with statin drugs for primary prevention in the absence of evidence that such treatment produces benefits that outweigh its harms.  They also seem enthused about basing treatment decisions on a statistical prognostic model that has not been shown to be accurate, and in fact which appears to be biased towards promoting excess treatment in the context in which it would be used.   The excess enthusiasm occurred in spite of evidence, and at times in spite of logic.

 One possible reason that the guideline developers got so enthused that they seemed unable to think straight appears to be their own conflicts of interest, as first publicly noted in a post on Pharmalot. Reviewing the disclosure forms provided with the guidelines revealed more detail.

Of the 13 people on the main treatment guideline panel who were not NHLBI staffers serving ex-officio, 7 had financial relationships with pharmaceutical companies that manufacture statins:

- Jennifer Robinson, co-chair, research funded by AstraZeneca and Merck;
- C Noel Bairey Merz, consulting for Abbott, Bristol-Myers Squib Novartis, and Pfizer;
- Robert H Eckel, consulting for Merck, Pfizer and Abbott;
- Anne Carol Goldberg, consulting for Abbott and Merck, research funded by Abbott, Merck, and Novartis;
- J Sanford Schwartz, consulting for Abbott, Merck and Pfizer, research funded by Pfizer;
- Karol Watson, consulting for Abbott, AstraZeneca, Merck and Pfizer, research funded by Merck;
- Peter W F Wilson, consulting for and research funded by Merck.

Of the 10 expert reviewers for this panel, 3 had financial relationships with pharmaceutical companies that manufacture statins
-  William Virgin Brown, consultant for Abbott, Bristol-Myers Squibb, and Pfizer;
-  Matthew Ito, consultant for Kowa;
- Robert S Rosenson, consultant for Novartis and Pfizer.

Of the 11 people on the risk prediction panel who were not NHLBI staffers serving ex-officio, 5 had financial relationships with pharmaceutical companies that manufacture statins
-David C Goff Jr, co-chair, research funded by Merck;
- Raymond Gibbons, consultant for AstraZeneca;

- Jennifer Robinson, research funded by AstraZeneca, and Merck;
- J Sanford Schwartz, consulting for Abbott, Merck and Pfizer, research funded by Pfizer [although these relationships were not listed as relevant to this panel, but found in the listing for the panel above];
- Peter W.F Wilson, consultant for and research funded by Merck.

Also, in the Abramson and Redberg NY Times op-ed, the authors noted

both the American Heart Association and the American College of Cardiology, while nonprofit entities, are heavily supported by drug companies

As noted on Pharmalot, the prevalence of conflicted panel members did not appear to conform to the standards for the development of trustworthy guidelines recently published by the Institute of Medicine:

whenever possible, guideline development group members should not have conflicts of interest… and the chair or co-chairs should not be a person(s) with conflicts of interest.

Also, noted by the Los Angeles Times was this comment from Dr John Abramson, lead author of the commentary on statins in primary prevention(4),


'There is overtreatment that’s been built into the risk calculator, and this is a warning sign about the overtreatment that’s built into the guidelines themselves and the conflicts of interest in the organizations that are overseeing the production of these guidelines,' said Dr. John Abramson, a Harvard University cardiologist who has argued that statins offer little value for people with a 10-year risk level of heart attack or stroke of less than 20%. 'There aren’t brakes being put on the enthusiasm and overreaching of the experts.'

'There are statin believers, and when you hear these experts talk, they’re talking emotionally, not scientifically,' Abramson added. 'The experts are using emotion, not science.'

As Joe Collier  observed, "people who have conflicts of interest often find giving clear advice (or opinions) particularly difficult."(5)

This difficulty giving clear advice, when amplified by a guideline for a common problem supported by prestigious non-profit organizations, and promoted by vigorous public relations, could lead to "more than 45 million middle-aged Americans who do not have cardiovascular disease being recommended for consideration of statin therapy" (per Ridker and Cook[4]) unnecessarily, likely resulting in millions suffering unneeded side effects, and billions in costs.  

Summary

Guidelines for management of a very common problem promulgated by a major medical society and a major disease oriented non-profit organization suggested a strategy that would vastly increase drug treatment of currently healthy patients.  The strategy appears not to have been based on good evidence.  When some of the problems with this evidence were pointed out, the guideline developers responded with illogic.  Apparently many of the guideline developers have financial relationships with the drug companies that would most profit from increases in drug treatment as recommended by the guidelines  Implementation of the new guidelines might results in millions of people in the US receiving unneeded drugs, with resultant side effects and costs. .

Do we need more examples of how conflicts of interest are causing the poor outcomes and excess costs that are wrecking our health care system?  Do we need more excuses not to eliminate conflicts of interest from guideline development?  Do we need more delay implementing the standards provided by the Institute of Medicine report on trustworthy guidelines?  Do we need more excuses not to drastically reduce conflicts of interest affecting academic medicine, medical societies, and disease specific non-profits, specifically starting with the earlier (and so far generally disregarded) Institute of Medicine report on conflicts of interest in medicine?

While we in the US argue incessantly in the details of minor reforms of our supposed free health care market, we ignore the rot at its foundations.  True health care reform would attack the conflicts of interest that have put money, not patients at the center of health care.


References

1.  Stone NJ, Robinson J, Lichtenstein AH,  et al.  2013 ACC/AHA guideline on the treatment of blood cholesterol to reduce atherosclerotic cardiovascular risk in adults: a report of the American College of Cardiology/American Heart Association Task Force on Practice Guidelines.  Circulation 2013.  Link here.
2.  Abramson JD, Rosenberg HG, Jewell N et al.  Should statins be prescribed to people at low risk of cardiovascular disease. Brit Med J 2013; 347: 15-17.  Link here.
3.  Goff Jr DC, Lloyd-Jones DM, Bennett G, et al.  2013 ACC/AHA Guideline on the Assessment of Cardiovascular
Risk.  Journal of the American College of Cardiology (2013), doi: 10.1016/j.jacc.2013.11.005.  Link here.
4.  Rikder PM, Cook NR. Statins: new American guidelines for prevention of cardiovascular disease.  Lancet 2013;   Link here.
5.   Collier J. The price of independence. Br Med J 2006; 332: 1447-9.  Link here

Kamis, 26 September 2013

Vested Interests and Their Influence on Physicians- New Understanding from Cognitive and Social Psychology

Evidence-based medicine proposes patient care decisions based on the best evidence from critically reviewed clinical research, knowledge of biology and the biopsychosocial context, and patients' values and preferences.  Yet physicians often fail to make evidence-based decisions, despite many efforts to educate, or incentivize them to do so.  We used to think that the main reason was physicians' lack of knowledge and understanding of EBM, and human cognitive limitations that make such evidence-based thinking difficult.  However, now we realize that physicians are deluged by  attempts to influence their decisions so as to favor vested interests, whether or not that is good for patients.

We have discussed various kinds of deception used in marketing meant to increase physicians' prescriptions for drugs, and recommendations for devices and health care services.  Physicians have not proved to be very resistant to these methods.

Now a new article provides a different perspective on how marketers use cognitive and social psychology to manipulate physicians.(1)  Sunita Sah's and Adriane Fugh-Berman's introduction stated,

Physicians often believe that a conscious commitment to ethical behavior and professionalism will protect them from industry influence.  Despite increasing concern over the extent of physician-industry relationships, physicians usually fail to recognize the nature and impact of subconscious and unintentional biases on therapeutic decision-making. Pharmaceutical and medical device companies, however, routinely demonstrate their knowledge of social psychology processes on behavior and apply these principles to their marketing. 

The article then listed a number of findings from social (and cognitive) psychology that marketers may use to their advantage on naive physicians.

Psychological Mechanisms Promoting Acceptance of Conflicts of Interest and Dubious Marketing Ploys

First, marketers may take advantage of cognitive biases and psychological mechanisms that allow physicians to accept marketing maneuvers while denying the effect of marketing on their decision making.

Confidence and Over-Confidence

People are strongly influenced by messages delivered with confidence and do not take the trouble to ascertain the accuracy of these messages if doing so requires effort or money.

I would add that many humans, including physicians, are also over-confident in the accuracy of their own judgments.  (In 1989 we showed  that physicians often were excessively confident in their judgments of patients' outcomes, in particular, about survival of critically ill patients.)(2)

Of course, marketers often state their messages with great confidence regardless of their accuracy.

So physicians need to try to restrain their own over-confidence, and be more skeptical of the confidence of others. Maybe this would just be an exercise in simple humility.

Self-Serving (or Ego) Biases

People tend to believe that the results of their decisions, or of their groups' decisions, are better than average.  This can be called the Lake Wobegon effect (from Garrison Keilor's fictional town in which all the children are above average.)

We and others have shown that physicians may be overly optimistic about the outcomes of their own (versus others') patients, or their clinical units' (versus others') outcomes, again in the context of predicting survival of critically ill patients.(3)  We have also posted about how corporate boards of directors seem to almost always think that their hired executives are better than average, at least when determining their executive compensation.

Similarly, Sah and Fugh-Berman wrote,

Physicians believe that their own prescribing behavior is unaffected by industry influence, although they concede that other physicians are susceptible to such influence.

Furthermore,

Social psychology research confirms that people have a 'bias blind spot,' namely, they are more likely to identify the existence of cognitive and motivational biases in other than in themselves.
But, as Dana and Lowenstein wrote,

It cannot both be true that most physicians are unbiased and that most other physicians are biased.


So, to put it bluntly, physicians ought to be more humble about their own ability to resist outside influences and the resulting biases. Again, some simple humility might help.

Cognitive Dissonance

Sah and Fugh-Berman pointed out that

While articulating and believing in the importance of scientific objectivity, physicians' biases to accept industry gifts create cognitive dissonance; that is, discomfort that arises from discrepancy between conflicting beliefs, or between beliefs and behaviors.

So,

Cognitive dissonance theory specifies three methods - not mutually exclusive - by which people manage or reduce dissonance.  Changing one of the dissonant beliefs, opinions or behaviors (possibly a difficult or painful process that requires sacrificing a pleasurable behavior or treasured belief); Lowering the importance of one of the discordant factors which can be accomplished by denial - forgetting or rejecting the significance of one or more of the conflicting cognitions; and adding consonant elements that resolve or lessen the dissonance (this may involve rationalizations to buffer the dissonance between conflicting cognitions.)

Physicians may use denial and rationalization to reduce cognitive dissonance caused by their concurrent desire for relationships with marketers and others with vested interests on one hand, and their professionalism and its obligation to put patients' needs first on the other hand.  Sah and Fugh-Berman cited Chimonas and colleagues,

Denial included (a) avoiding thinking about the conflict of interest; (b) rejecting the notion that industry relationships affect physician behavior, and (c) disavowing or universalizing responsibility for problems that arose from conflicts of interest ('there's always a conflict of interest...').  Rationalizations included (a) asserting techniques that would help maintain impartiality and (b) reasoning that meetings with drug reps were educational and benefited patients.

We have discussed various public justifications for accepting conflicts of interest by physicians and other health care decision makers that employed a variety of logical fallacies along these lines.

So physicians need to re-examine their treasured beliefs and the gratification they get from relationships with industry (as opposed to those with patients, colleagues, friends and families).  They could remember the advice that no one can serve two masters.

Sense of Entitlement

Physicians' sense of entitlement, especially given the increasing stress upon them, may be used to rationalize relationships with drug, device and biotechnology companies since these corporations seem to be among their few friends (versus insurance companies, government agencies, and sometimes hospital administrations whom physicians feel may be more burdensome.).  So, in one study,

Implicitly reminding physicians of the burdens of medical training and their working conditions more than doubled reported willingness to accept gifts....
So physicians need to reconsider that to which they feel entitled.  This is the third instance in which some humility might help. 

Principles of Influence Used by Marketers

Markets seem to also be well acquainted with the six principles of influence and persuasion identified by Cialdini and colleagues.

Reciprocity

The norm of reciprocity - the obligation to help those who have helped you - is one of the guiding principles of human interaction

This is the foundation of the effect of relatively small conflicts of interest, such as giving of small gifts.

Physicians pay off industry gifts through changes in their practice

Furthermore,

Gifts associated with a subtle implicit request may be more likely to achieve compliance than gifts that call for explicit reciprocation. 
So physicians need to be wary of Greeks, or anyone else bearing gifts, even those less conspicuous than wheeled horses.

Commitment and Consistence

Consistency is highly valued in our society and associated with rationality and stability.  After committing to a decision or opinion, people justify that choice or opinion by remaining consistent with it.

So marketers try to get physicians to make small commitments to leverage larger ones.  This is

why drug reps, ask, for example, 'will you try my drug on your next five patients?'
So physicians should remember there is no virtue in commitment to erroneous beliefs.  "A foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds." - Ralph Waldo Emerson

Social Proof

This is basically the deliberate deployment of the logical fallacy of the appeal to common practice.

Social proof, also referred to as social validation or conformity, is the practice of deciding what to do by looking at what others are doing.

So,

If accepting industry gifts is a cultural norm in medicine, physicians will continue to do so.  The opinions of colleagues are often used by industry representatives to sway physicians to adopt a particular therapy. 

This may be why industry works so hard to sign up health care academics.

Trainees in an institution, for example, are affected by the institution's stated policies but also - and sometimes more so - by what they see their mentors do.
So physicians, who often pride themselves on independence, need to be skeptical about the need to follow the crowd.

Liking or Rapport

The more you like someone, the more you are apt to follow their advice, even if your feelings towards them have been manipulated.

This is obviously why drug representatives, for example, are so nice to physicians.

Physicians often feel overworked, underpaid, and unappreciated [ed note -  and their is plenty of evidence, some of which we have discussed on this blog, that this is not unreasonable.]  Drug reps dispense sympathy, flattery, food, gifts, services and income-enhancing opportunities and seek to ask nothing in return but scholarly consideration of the benefits of drugs.
So physicians need to reconsider who really are their friends, and be skeptical of "friends" with something to sell. 

Authority and Security

This is basically the deliberate deployment of the logical fallacy of the appeal to authority.  The best example is industry's efforts to recruit key opinion leaders, that is health professionals who are perceived as authority figures, but have really been hired to market.

From an industry perspective, the best KOLs radiate status and authority while successfully convincing their peers (and perhaps themselves) of their illusory independence and lack of bias.

Note that

KOL speakers not only influence audience members' prescribing behavior, but also - as predicted by cognitive dissonance theory - become more convinced themselves of the benefits of the products they endorse.
So physicians need to be skeptical of those claiming to be authorities, especially when they are connected with people who have something to sell.

Summary

We used to strongly believe (and Dr Wally Smith and I used to teach a course to the effect that) the major barrier to true evidence-based practice was the cognitive limitations that physicians share with all humans.  We thought in terms of cognitive biases and the inappropriate use of cognitive heuristics leading physicians to inaccurately judge the probabilities of diagnoses and medical outcomes, and thus make less than optimal decisions.

Now it seems apparent that the deliberate influencing of health professionals' judgments and decisions by external actors, mainly those interested in selling more products and services, but sometimes by those with ideological or political motives, is currently a much more important challenge to evidence based practice.  It looks like the influencers may be very knowledgeable about human cognitive limitations and how social psychology influences judgment and decisions, and may use this knowledge to pursue their vested interests, at the financial and physical expense of patients, and ultimately the public.

 True health care reform would encourage professional education designed to increase resistance to external influences that put self-interest ahead of patients' and the public's health, and careful regulation that would decrease some of the more dangerous practices used.  Of course, much more resistance might be achieved if physicians used a little more common sense when dealing with people who are obviously trying to sell them on goods, services, or ideas.  A good proportion of the deceptive methods discussed above could be countered by remembering the usefulness of humility, skepticism, and a few simple aphorisms.   

Again, as we have written repeatedly, not only should all conflicts of interest be disclosed for the sake of honesty, but physicians and other health professionals ought to consider repudiating most of all of them, maybe at some personal expense, but in the interest of re-establishing their commitment to putting the patient, not their own self-interest, or the vested interests of others, first.  
 

References

1.  Sah S, Fugh-Berman A. Physicians under the influence: social psychology and industry marketing strategies.  J Law Med Ethics 2013; 14:  . Link here:

2. Poses RM, Bekes C, Copare F, Scott WE.  The answer to "what are my chances, doctor?"  depends on whom is asked: prognostic disagreement and inaccuracy for critically ill patients.  Crit Care Med 1989; 17: 827-833.  Link here.

3. Poses RM,  McClish DK, Bekes C, Scott WE, Morley JN. Ego bias, reverse ego bias, and physicians' prognostic judgments for critically ill patients. Crit Care Med 1991; 19: 1533-1539.  Link here.

Senin, 17 Desember 2012

The "King of Pain" Recants - Pharmaceutical Paid Key Opinion Leader Admits It Was All "Misinformation"

This may be a first.  A Wall Street Journal story announced that the "key opinion leader" who played a pivotal role in the promotion of  aggressive use of narcotics to treat non-malignant chronic pain has had a change of heart.  

Background - Embracing Narcotics

In the long ago time when I was in medical school, the wisdom was then that narcotics (that is, drugs like morphine or heroin, the latter not legal) should only be used in severe acute pain, like that due to bad trauma or occurring post-operatively, or for the pain of terminal illnesses, like cancer.  The reason their use was so restricted was that the drugs were believed to cause frequent adverse effects, from severe constipation, to addiction, to respiratory depression and death.

However, starting in the 1990s, the conventional wisdom changed.  Suddenly, the focus was on the under-treatment of chronic, but not malignant pain, and it became permissible, or even preferable, to use potent narcotics for this purpose.  Physicians like me who were very conservative in their use of narcotics were chastised for under-treating pain.

The Wall Street Journal article explained how this radical change in approach was apparently engineered by a few key opinion leaders, particularly Dr Russell Portenoy.  It opened,

Two decades ago, the prominent New York pain-care specialist drove a movement to help people with chronic pain. He campaigned to rehabilitate a group of painkillers derived from the opium poppy that were long shunned by physicians because of their addictiveness.

Dr. Portenoy's message was wildly successful. Today, drugs containing opioids like Vicodin, OxyContin and Percocet are among the most widely prescribed pharmaceuticals in America. 

The article provided graphics showing that per capita prescription narcotic use has more than tripled since 1999, 

A Change Driven by Wishful Thinking, not Evidence

Unfortunately, as the article made clear, the radical change that seemed so odd to some of us physicians who were trained before the 1990s was not driven by any good evidence from clinical research.

Per the WSJ,

Because doctors feared they were dangerous and addictive, opioids were long reserved mainly for cancer patients. But Dr. Portenoy argued that they could be also safely be taken for months or years by people suffering from chronic pain. Among the assertions he and his followers made in the 1990s: Less than 1% of opioid users became addicted, the drugs were easy to discontinue and overdoses were extremely rare in pain patients. 


However, Dr Portenoy's contention seemed to be based only on a small case-series of patients, lacking any sort of control group, and too small and likely too selective to generalize, particularly to patients with chronic, non-malignant pain.(Portenoy RK, Foley KM.   Chronic use of opioid analgesics in non-malignant pain: report of 38 cases. Pain 1986; 25:171-86.  This article does not seem to be available online.)

In 1986, at the age of 31, he co-wrote a seminal paper arguing that opioids could also be used in the much larger group of people without cancer who suffered chronic pain. The paper was based on just 38 cases and included several caveats. Nevertheless, it opened the door to much broader prescribing of the drugs for more common complaints such as nerve or back pain. 

 Dr Portenoy also cited

the statistic that less than 1% of opioid users became addicted.

Today, even proponents of opioid use say that figure was wrong. 'It's obviously crazy to think that only 1% of the population is at risk for opioid addiction,' said Lynn Webster, president-elect of the American Academy of Pain Medicine, one of the publishers of the 1996 statement. 'It's just not true.'

The figure came from a single-paragraph report in the New England Journal of Medicine in 1980 describing hospitalized patients briefly given opioids.

The reference here appears to be a letter to the New England Journal of Medicine ( Porter J, Jick H. Addiction rate in patients treated with narcotics. New England Journal of Medicine 1980; 302:123.  Link here.)  This was literally one paragraph long, so the methods of the research it reported cannot be rigorously evaluated.  In any event, the letter appears to have retrospectively documented an observation of hospitalized patients who were given at least a single dose of narcotics, and thus appears not relevant to the effects of long-term narcotics on patients with chronic pain. 

Thus, Dr Portenoy's enthusiasm for aggressive use of narcotics in non-malignant chronic pain was never based on any good evidence from well designed and performed randomized controlled trials with long-term followup that showed that narcotics were safe and effective in this setting.  At best, Dr Portenoy's and colleagues' contentions that narcotics should be liberally utilized for such patient were based on wishful thinking, not good evidence.


A Change Driven by Stealth Marketing

The WSJ article documented how Dr Portenoy was a prime mover in what appeared to be deceptive stealth campaigns to market narcotics for chronic, non-malignant pain.  Dr Portenoy's 1986 case-series

opened the door to much broader prescribing of the drugs for more common complaints such as nerve or back pain.

Charming and articulate, he became a sought-after public speaker. He argued that opioids are a 'gift from nature' that were being forsaken because of 'opiophobia' among doctors. 'We had to destigmatize these drugs,' said Dr. Portenoy.

He rose to chairman of pain medicine and palliative care at Beth Israel Medical Center in New York. His small office is studded with awards and evidence of his offbeat sense of humor. He prominently displays a magazine mock-up that jokingly dubs him 'The King of Pain.'

At medical conferences, his confident, knowing manner helped smooth the way for his message. Before an audience of government regulators, he once joked that he might tell a patient at low risk of abuse: 'Here, [have] six months of drugs. See you later,' he said, according to a Food and Drug Administration transcript. Amid laughter, he added, 'It's just hyperbole. I don't actually do that.'

Steven Passik, a psychologist who once worked closely with Dr. Portenoy and describes him as his mentor, says their message wasn't based on scientific evidence so much as a zeal to improve patients' lives. 'It had all the makings of a religious movement at the time,' he says. 'It had that kind of a spirit to it.'

So Dr Portenoy became a respected opinion leader.  His influence was demonstrated by how he generated disciples

 Dr. Portenoy's ideas about opioids reached into mainstream medicine and attracted outspoken advocates. In a 1998 talk in Houston, Alan Spanos, a South Carolina pain specialist, said patients with chronic noncancer pain could be trusted to decide themselves how many painkillers to take without risk of overdose. According to a recording, Dr. Spanos said he understood that a patient would simply 'go to sleep' before stopping breathing. While asleep, he said, the patient 'can't take a dangerous dose. It sounds scary, but as far as I know, nobody anywhere is getting burned by doing it this way.'

Dr Portenoy was affiliated with organized efforts that facilitated the marketing of narcotics for chronic malignant pain.  The marketing used clinical practice guidelines to push narcotics

Dr. Portenoy helped write a landmark 1996 consensus statement by two professional pain societies that said there was little risk of addiction or overdose among pain patients

The campaign enlisted government regulators, and thus seemed to include an element of regulatory capture,


One of Dr. Portenoy's chief complaints was that doctors were reluctant to prescribe opioids because they feared scrutiny by regulators or law enforcement. In the second half of the 1990s, he and his followers campaigned successfully for policies to change that.

In 1998, the Federation of State Medical Boards released a recommended policy reassuring doctors that they wouldn't face regulatory action for prescribing even large amounts of narcotics, as long as it was in the course of medical treatment. In 2004 the group called on state medical boards to make undertreatment of pain punishable for the first time.

This case demonstrated the direct involvement of pharmaceutical companies who sold narcotics,

That policy was drawn up with the help of several people with links to opioid makers, including David Haddox, a senior Purdue Pharma executive then and now. The federation said it received nearly $2 million from opioid makers since 1997. The federation says it derives the majority of its funding from administering medical licensing exams, credential verification, and data services.

A federation-published book outlining the opioid policy was funded by opioid makers including Purdue Pharma, Endo Health Soluttions Inc, and others, with proceeds totaling $280,000 going to the federation. .

 The campaign also involved an important hospital accrediting organization

In 2001, the Joint Commission, [JCAHO] which accredits U.S. hospitals, issued new standards telling hospitals to regularly ask patients about pain and to make treating it a priority. The now-familiar pain scale was introduced in many hospitals, with patients being asked to rate their pain from one to 10 and circle a smiling or frowning face.

The Joint Commission published a guide sponsored by Purdue Pharma. 'Some clinicians have inaccurate and exaggerated concerns" about addiction, tolerance and risk of death, the guide said. "This attitude prevails despite the fact there is no evidence that addiction is a significant issue when persons are given opioids for pain control.'


A Change Leading to Personal Enrichment

Meanwhile, Dr Portenoy was personally profiting from his relationships with pharmaceutical companies


Over his career, Dr. Portenoy has disclosed relationships with more than a dozen companies, most of which produce opioid painkillers. 'My viewpoint is that I can have those relationships, they would benefit my educational mission, they benefit in my research mission, and to some extent, they can benefit my own pocketbook, without producing in me any tendency to engage in undue influence or misinformation,' he said.

Dr. Portenoy and Beth Israel declined to provide details of their funding by drug companies. A 2007 fundraising prospectus from Dr. Portenoy's program shows that his program received millions of dollars over the preceding decade in funding from opioid makers including Endo, Abbott Laboratories, Cephalon, Purdue Pharma and  Johnson & Johnson.  

He currently also appears to be on the advisory boards of  Zars Pharma IncRelevare Therapeutics, and Cytogel Pharma.

Thus, it seems that Dr Portenoy fit the usual definition of key opinion leader.  He was regarded as an authority in his area and his opinions were obviously influential.  He was paid by health care corporations with interests in selling their goods or services, in this case, narcotic drugs, and was using his influence to promote individual patient care decisions and policy decisions that facilitated the widespread use of these drugs. 

A Change Leading to Sick and Dead Patients

Since the campaign to "destigmatize" narcotics began, the US has seen what many have called an epidemic of narcotic adverse effects.  The WSJ article provided graphs showing that narcotic related deaths and hospital admissions both increased more than five times since 1999.   As the WSJ put it,

 some specialists now question whether the drugs should be prescribed so freely for months or years to people with chronic pain that isn't related to cancer, as Dr. Portenoy proposed 25 years ago. "People lost sight of the fact that these are dangerous drugs that are highly addictive," said Jane Ballantyne, a pain specialist at the University of Washington. She once agreed with Dr. Portenoy and proponents of broad opioid use but now believes they need to be used more selectively.


Dr Portenoy Recants

What is most remarkable about this case is that it seems to be the first in which a highly influential industry paid key opinion leader has publicly had a change of heart.

Now, Dr. Portenoy and other pain doctors who promoted the drugs say they erred by overstating the drugs' benefits and glossing over risks. 'Did I teach about pain management, specifically about opioid therapy, in a way that reflects misinformation? Well, against the standards of 2012, I guess I did,' Dr. Portenoy said in an interview with The Wall Street Journal. 'We didn't know then what we know now.'


I would note there is some sophistry there.  There was never good evidence for narcotics' effectiveness or safety for patient with chronic, non-malignant pain.

In fact, Dr Portenoy also admitted that, sort of,

'Data about the effectiveness of opioids does not exist,' Dr. Portenoy said in his recent Journal interview. To get a painkiller approved, companies must prove that it is better at reducing pain than a sugar pill during short trials often lasting less than 12 weeks. 'Do they work for five years, 10 years, 20 years?' Dr. Portenoy said in the Journal interview. 'We're at the level of anecdote.'


Again, it is not that the data that supported the use of the drugs has disappeared, or that new data has been developed that contradicts the old data.  There never has been any good data, that is, from well designed and performed randomized controlled trials that demonstrate that the benefits of narcotics outweigh their harms for patients with chronic, non malignant pain.  It does not exist now and it never existed.

Dr Portenoy also admitted,

'I gave innumerable lectures in the late 1980s and '90s about addiction that weren't true,' Dr. Portenoy said in a 2010 videotaped interview with a fellow doctor. The Journal reviewed the conversation, much of which is previously unpublished.
In it, Dr. Portenoy said it was 'quite scary' to think how the growth in opioid prescribing driven by people like him had contributed to soaring rates of addiction and overdose deaths. 'Clearly, if I had an inkling of what I know now then, I wouldn't have spoken in the way that I spoke. It was clearly the wrong thing to do,' Dr. Portenoy said in the recording.

So not only did the Wall Street Journal article describe how the overuse of narcotics for chronic, non-malignant pain came from wishful thinking energized by the possibility of corporate and personal profit, it showed how the chief medical cheer leader for these drugs now admits he was wrong.


Summary

In summary, it appears that the huge increase in the use of narcotics to treat chronic, non-malignant pain was never based on clear convincing evidence from well-designed studies.  At best it was based on irrational enthusiasm and wishful thinking by some very vocal and persuasive advocates.  These advocates seemed to become "key opinion leaders," that is, influential people who promoted the use of pharmaceuticals while they were being paid by pharmaceutical companies, and were likely involved in what appears to be systematic stealth marketing campaign by the pharmaceutical companies that make narcotics.  These campaigns included production of clinical practice guidelines promoted as authoritative, and enlistment of accrediting organizations and government regulatory agencies.

One particularly disturbing part of this story was the involvement of numerous people and organizations  entrusted by society to promote good medical care.  It shows how physicians, other health professionals, and the public at large must be very skeptical of vocal advocates of new, aggressive, "innovative" approaches, of clinical practice guidelines even those developed by apparently prestigious professional societies, of accrediting organizations, and of government regulators.  That is discouraging, and could lead to the cynical approach of simply not trusting anyone.

I would note, however, that two ways the headlong rush to over-use of narcotics could have been derailed would have been:
-  employment of extreme skepticism of people paid by narcotics manufacturers advocating increased use of these drugs, no matter how distinguished, scholarly, or influential these people appear to be.  This suggests the need for general skepticism of people with financial relationships with health care corporations pushing the goods or services these corporations provide, or pushing policies that would aid the selling of those goods or services
-  a rigorous evidence-based medicine approach, meaning making clinical and policy decisions based on the best evidence found by systematic search from rigorously evaluated clinical research about the benefits and harms of these decisions, informed by patients' values.  Such an approach would have revealed there was never any good clinical evidence to support long-term use of narcotics for chronic, non-malignant pain, the particular "innovation" being pushed in this case.

So I would argue that the case of the legal narcotics pushers underlines the need for utmost transparency about conflicts of interest affecting people and organizations that advocate for particular approaches to health care, and to the management of individual patients; continuing movement to bar at least the most egregious conflicts, as per the Institute of Medicine report on the topic (look here); and the need for the very skeptical, rigorous application of true evidence-based medicine approaches.  

Finally, I must note that this seems to be the first time that a prominent, highly influential key opinion leader  has recanted.  Maybe he will write an article entitled "Dr Drug Pusher?" - just joking, but at least one former  key opinion leader did write the confessional  "Dr Drug Rep."  Maybe this is the beginning of a movement toward health care based on logic and evidence rather than wishful thinking, irrational enthusiasm, or ideology, or even worse, on deception or personal enrichment.